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The Development of International Law with
Respect to Trans-Boundary Water Resouces:
Co-operation for Mutual Advantage
or Continentalism's Thin Edge of the Wedge?
I. A. McDOUGALL*
INTRODUCION
The proposition to be tested by this paper has been summarized as follows:
'There is no doubt that the International Joint Commission has successfully
discharged the high functions entrusted to it by the Boundary Waters Treaty.
It has acted successfully as judge, advisor and administrator for two great
neighbours during a period of unparalleled expansion when conflicts of interest
were bound to arise. In playing its triple role the Commission has developed
techniques of continuous consultation which are a model for the world...
[ithas] shown the peoples of North America and the world at large that
neighbours can with goodwill, solve even their most serious difficulties through
acceptance of the rule of law."**

The conclusion adopted by the paper is essentially the null hypothesis;
namely, that the International Joint Commission, as a means of conflict resolution with respect to the use and development of trans-boundary waters, has
proved ineffective, and probably to the disadvantage of Canada in the long run.
It is suggested that, not only has the Commission failed to develop rules of law
acceptable to the two entities as guiding principles, but has served to only
obscure the founding legal relations laid out by the Boundary Waters Treaty in
1909.
It is suggested that this conclusion has general significance to Canada in
two respects. First, the failure of the Commission to adhere to pre-existing
agreed principles of law has resulted in vast jurisdictional encroachments upon
the Canadian right to develop resources of internal origin for the maximum
benefit of its citizens. The Columbia River Treaty and the recent U.S. water
export proposals are eloquent examples to the point. Second, to the extent that
Canadian jurisdiction is eroded (under the deceptive cloak of the regularized
procedures of the commission) over domestic water supplies, there is a concomitantly lessening ability to direct secondary resource development. For
example, where Canadian power interests are sacrificed in an agreement such as
the Columbia, the Canadian ability to entice industrial locations by firms budgeting large amounts on electric power is obviously reduced. This is also true in
those cases where Canadian control over consumptive uses maybe of importance
to domestic agrarian sectors but is forfeited as a consequence of downstream
pressure from the U.S. entity.
* A member of the 1970-71 Graduating Class at Osgoode Hall Law School of York

University.

** L.M. Bloomfield and G.F. Fitzgerald: Boundary Waters Problems: Canada and the

United States, The Carswell Co. Ltd., Toronto, 1958, at 63.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

(VCOL. 9, No. 2

The paper is organized into nine sections. It begins with a brief outline of
the International Joint Commission's jurisdiction. This is followed by a discussion of the Boundary Waters Treaty and the early Canadian objections.
Sections three and four deal with the highlighting negotiations concerning transboundary waters from 1909 to the present. The change in Canadian position
with respect to the second article of the Boundary Waters Treaty, and the erosion of its effectiveness as a rule of law are considered. The fifth section outlines
the concomitant rise in status of a principle known as the "doctrine of equitable
apportionment". The obscurity of its meaning, its connection with the complementary doctrine of prior appropriation, and its more general implications
with respect to both the development of international law, and the development
of water-sharing agreements have been considered here. The sixth and seventh
portions of the paper concern themselves with the mounting pressure for a continental water distribution scheme as a means of tapping the purported Canadian "reserves", and a number of the more significant problems that are associated with present proposals respectively. It is argued in light of these issues, and
in light of the ambiguously defined national prerogatives under present law, that
there is an obvious advantage to a firm re-assertion of the original provisions of
the Boundary Waters Treaty for Canada.
Section eight deals with two vehicles which could accomplish this purpose;
the proposed Shuswap-Okanagan Diversion, and the Skagit Valley dispute. The
ninth and final portion contains a summary of the paper's recommendations and
conclusions.

I
THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION
The International Joint Commission (hereafter referred to as simply
I.J.C.) was established by Article VII of the Boundary Waters Treaty1 and is
bound to the guiding principles spelled out by Article VIII. Essentially these are
as below:
"The High Contracting Parties shall have, each on its own side of the
boundary, equal and similar rights in the use of the waters hereinbefore defined as
boundary waters.
The following order of precedence shall be observed among the various uses
enumerated hereinafter for these waters, and no use shall be permitted which tends
materially to conflict with or restrain any other use which is given preference over
it in this order of precedence:
(1) Uses for domestic and sanitary purposes;
(2) Uses for navigation, including the service of canals for the purposes of
navigation;
I Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the Boundary
between the United States and Canada, signed at Washington, January 11, 1909: ratification advised by Senate March 3, 1909; ratified by Great Britain March 31, 1910; ratified
by President April 1, 1910; ratifications exchanged at Washington May 5, 1910; proclaimed
May 18, 1910. 36 stat. 2448; TS 548; 11 Redmond 2607, British Treaty Series 1910,
No. 23; Treaties and agreements affecting Canada, in force between His Majesty and the
United States of America, 312 Kings Printer, Ottawa, 1927.
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(3) Uses for power and for irrigation purposes.
The foregoing provisions shall not apply to disturb any existing uses of
boundary waters on either side of the boundary." 2
The I..C. has two types of jurisdiction: it has compulsory jurisdiction by
virtue of Article III and IV 3 and may acquire jurisdiction by voluntary consent
of the High Contracting Parties per Articles IX and X 4 . In relation to Article III
and IV commission rulings are final. Article IX on the other hand only confers
the power to investigate, study, report, and make recommendations. While
Article X provides for arbitration by the commission over any question referred
it, this provision has yet to be exercised.
The commission has concentrated its efforts upon the following subject
headings since its creation:
(1) approval of hydroelectric, flood control, and reclamation and irrigation storage
structures which entail flood damage upstream across the frontier
(2) approval of hydroelectric structures and navigation improvements on boundary
waters
(3) applications for approval of assorted minor river works
(4) water appropriations from boundary and trans-boundary waters: both intra
and inter-basin
(5) investigations of various types (eg: lake levels, Great Lakes water pollution,
etc.)5

Of concern to this paper are those applications which concern transboundary waters, which will principally fall under subject headings (1) and
(4). It is within these areas that most conflict has developed. In the case of
trans-boundary waters it evidently has been less easy to demark and isolate

areas of mutual concern and interest than has been true of boundary water disputes. Consequently the I.IC. applications concerning trans-boundary waters
have been chfracterized by sharp conflicts of opinion between the two Parties,
and have resulted in a cumulative erosion of Canadian sovereignty vis-h-vis
water resources of domestic origin. The validity of this contention is perhaps
best illustrated by a review of the highlighting disputes between the two countries, and their ultimate impact upon the Canadian position, commencing with
the BoundaryWaters Treaty itself.
Preliminary article of the treaty defines boundary waters as:
"the waters from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting
waterways, or the portions thereof, along which the international boundary between
the United States and the Dominion of Canada passes, including tributary waters
which in their natural channels would flow into such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or
waters flowing from such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or the waters of rivers flowing
across the boundary".
a Article H1 requires that further uses or obstructions or diversions of a temporary or
permanent nature of boundary waters shall be only made with the approval of the commission save as provided for by special agreements between the Parties. Article IV requires
that neither Party obstruct boundary waters, trans-boundary waters at a lower level than
the boundary, and waters flowing from boundary waters so as to raise the natural level of
waters on the other side of the boundary without approval by the commission.
4
Article IX provides for voluntary submission of questions of difference to the
commission who shall examine and report upon facts and make recommendations neither
of which are binding at law. Article X is essentially the same as the Article above save for
the fact of any decision reached being a binding arbitration. This article has never been
employed.
5For elaboration in each area see Bloomfield and Fitzgerald, Boundary Waters
Problems: Canadaand the UnitedStates, Carswell, Toronto, 1958.
2The
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IT
THE BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY OF 1909
The establishment and empowerment of an International Joint Commission was but one of two or more objectives of the Canadian-American Boundary
Waters Agreement.7 This treaty was realized in partial s response to an international dispute of a decade earlier between the United States and the Republic
of Mexico concerning the Rio Grande. 9 The treaty can be viewed as an attempt
by the United States to formally incorporate' 0 policy doctrines it enunciated
over the course of its earlier negotiations" with Mexico as established CanadianAmerican international law.

The claims by the government of Mexico concerned the pre-emption of
large agricultural tracts and a once flourishing townsite 2 as a direct consequence
of upstream diversions from the U.S. section of the Rio Grande. In reply to formal protests by Mexico, the United States asserted the now famous Harmon
Doctrine s :
"That the rules of international law imposed upon the United States no duty
to deny to its inhabitants the use of the water of that part of the Rio Grande lying
wholly within the United States, although such use resulted in reducing the volume
of water in the river below the point where it ceased to be entirely within the United
States, the supposition of the existance of such a duty being INCONSISTANT WITH
THE SOVEREIGN JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES OVER THE
NATIONAL DOMAIN."'14

In contrast with pre-existing precepts of international riparian law, the
Harmon Doctrinerepresented the extreme of nationalistic positions. The somewhat unorthodox nature of the doctrine is apparent when viewed in comparison
with ProfessorOppenhein'si5 summary in his treatise on international law.
"Just like independence territorial supremacy does not give a boundless liberty
of action ... a state is, in spite of its territorial supremacy, not allowed to alter the
natural conditions of its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural conditions
of the territory of a neighbouring state, for instance, to stop or divert the flow of a
river which runs from its own into neighbouring territory."16
0

See Articles VII, VIII, IX, X, XI.
Supra note 1.
8 The treaty was also in partial response to a suggestion put forward by a Mr. J.S.
Durvis who was one of the Canadian delegates to an irrigation conference in Denver,
Colorado in 1894.
0
John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, House Document No. 551,
56 the Congress 2nd Session, Washington 1906, volume 1, at 653 and passim.
10 In particular its second Article discussed infra.
11 See Harmon References Infra.
12 Both of which were themselves dependent upon irrigation waters derived from
the river.
13 The doctrine is named after the then U.S. Attorney General, Judson Harmon.
14 Judson Harmon as cited by John Bassett Moore, A Digest of InternationalLaw
at 653, 654 supranote 9. The emphasis is my own.
1 In 1909 Professor Oppenheim was a lecturer in Public International Law at the
7

London School of Economics, prior to this being Professor Ordinaires of Law at the
University of Basel, Switzerland.
16 Oppenheim as cited by Sir Robert Borden, House of Commons Debates, III
Session, 11th parliament, 1910-11, vol. 1, at 903-904.
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Oppenheim's formulation of the international rule was, in 1909, familiar to
much of the United States and Canada wherein the Common law ripariandoctrine still applied. Halsburyhas summarized this rule as follows:
"Every riparian owner may divert the water of a stream for purposes in connection with his land, or for other purposes, but he is bound to return the water
which he has diverted into the stream again before it leaves his land substantially
undiminished. in volume and unaltered in character; for a lower riparian owner,
subject to the rights of an upper owner, is entitled to have the water flowing in the
natural bed of the stream come to him unaltered in'17
quality and quantity, and come
to his land in its ordinary and accustomed channel.

Both Canada' 8 and Mexico 19 argued in favour of retaining the common
law's doctrine for the limitation it imported with respect to upstream uses. The
United States however remained adamant in its refusal to concede it international authority for, in Attorney General Harmon'sown language:
"... what is really contended for is a servitude which makes the lower country
dominant and subjects the upper country to the burden of arresting its development
and denying its inhabitants the use of a provision which nature has supplied entirely
within its own territory... in my opinion the rules, principles,
and precedents of
international law impose no liability upon the United States. " 20

Viewed in one respect, the position asserted by the United States represented a quite reasonable attempt to extend its exclusive right over national territory
so as to include water as welt as land resources. Indeed, the Canadian negotiators
in Washington appeared quite prepared 2' to assume the American view of the
matter. One of their number, George C. Gibbons, 2 in a letter to Sir Wilfrid
Laurier 3 noted:
"There is no limitation on the sovereign right of each nation over waters
within its own territory any more than over its lands. As a matter of comity all that
one State can ask of the other in regard to private
interests injured by diversions in
such other is that these should be protected."2 4

The United States realized upon the objective of formally installing the
Harmon Doctrine as the guiding principle of Canadian-American boundary
water law with the completion and ratification of the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909.25 The relevant provision was the second article (hereafter referred to as
simply Article II):
"Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself or to the several State
governments on the one side and the Dominion or Provincial governments on the
other as the case may be, subject to any treaty provisions now existing with respect
17 Halsbury'sLaws of England, 2nd edition, vol. 33, Butterworth and Co. London,
1939, at 559.
18 See House of Commons Debates, Session 1910-11, vol. 1, at 869-913 Debate on
First reading of Boundary Waters Treaty.
19 John Bassett Moore, A Digest of InternationalLaw, supranote 9.
20
Judson Harmon as quoted in Bloomfield and Fitzgerald, Boundary Waters Problems: Canadaand the United States, supra note 5 at 43.
21 Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. I, 1909-1918 Department of
External Affairs, Queen's Printers 1967 at 361-448.
22 George C. Gibbons was a former member of the International Waterways Commission (which was the I.J.C.'s antecedent) and played a prominent role in the treaty's
negotiation and drafting. In this same letter Gibbons went so far as to cite Sir Robert
Phillmore as authority for the proposition that Canada was in no position to dispute the
U.S. claim to absolute jurisdiction over water in parity with its control of land.
23 who was Prime Minister at the time.
24
Supra Note 21, at 368.
25
Supra note 1.
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thereto, the exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion, whether
temporary or permanent, of all waters on its own side of the line which in their
natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters; but it is
agreed that an interference with or diversion from their natural channel of such
waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any injury on the other side of the
boundary shall give rise to the same rights and entitle the injured parties to the same
legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or
interference occurs: but this provision shall not apply to cases already existing
or to
cases expressly covered by special agreement between the parties hereto."26

However when Article I and its antecedent, the Harmon Doctrine are
closely examined it may be seen that they can confer upon the upstream riparian
power considerably more than mere "exclusive jurisdiction and control" ' 27 In
the economic sense they permit the upstream nation to 'underprice' the cost of
development for, in the event of a diversion or storage project preempting downstream riparian interests, the nation that undertakes development need only
consider those costs arising within its own jurisdiction. Given that there are
downstream costs to the neighbouring jurisdiction such a situation implies that
the real economic costs of development will be understated by 2way
of shifting
8
the diseconomies of development onto the downstream riparian.
Whether or not such a loss to the downstream state was a probable result
of Article II was contingent upon first, the effectiveness of the remedy afforded
the injured nation per the terms of the latter half of the Article, and second,
(assuming that some effect can be given to the remedy) the level of riparian
exploitation in the downstream state. For convenience2 9 each of these factors is
separately discussed below;
(1) EFFECTIVENESS OF ARTICLE II'S REMEDY - to afford the
injured party access to the courts of the injuring party's jurisdiction
was, of itself, not a guarantee of those rights (ie: of compensation and
enjoinment) appurtenant to the operation of the ripariandoctrine at
common law. This view was recognized by Sir Robert Borden0 who
was quick to draw attention to it when the treaty was presented to the
House of Commons for the first reading in 1910:
"MR. BORDEN (HALIFAX) ... but suppose the diversion has been authorized
by a statute of the United States.
MR. PUGSLEY:31 Then I take it would be the duty of both countries, the
United States government in this case ... to make provision for the payment of
any damages. That would be the obligation of each party under the terms of
this treaty.
MR. BORDEN: If the minister's statement could be added as a rider to the
treaty it would make it very plain, but there is nothing in the treaty to that effect.
On the contrary there is a direct statement that the United States reserves
absolute jurisdiction and control over that very thing, and therefore can pass
such a statute as I have alluded to without apparently infringing the terms of
this treaty, rather in accordance with its very terms. Then the citizen would not
have in the United States the same rights as he would have if the diversion had
20 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28
For example the U.S. - Mexican dispute.
29 The second factor is conditional upon first establishing that Article 11 does import
a remedy of some effect.
30
Sir Robert Borden was leader of the opposition at the time.
81 Mr. Pugsley was Minister of Public Works at the time.
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taken place in Alberta. Therefore I do not think that you
32 can work out the
provisions of the treaty in the way the minister suggests."

Time has clearly established the opposition leader's argument in
most respects. In the first place, since 1909 a majority of river works
have been public undertakings and thus sanctioned by law in both
Canada and the U.S. In the second place the majority of U.S. State
jurisdictions and Canadian Provincial jurisdictions have abandoned or
modified the ripariandoctrine in favour of their own legislative scheme
of allocation priorities among water user groups. British Columbia's
legislation is such an example. All rights in rivers, per the B.C. Water
Act 33 are vested in the province. Consequently, a downstream riparian
in the Province may have no cause of action if injured by way of a
Crown-sanctioned undertaking upstream. If the river was a transboundary water, and downstream loss occurred in the U.S., per
Article II the rights of the U.S. riparian would not exceed those of
his Canadian counterparts; namely he would seem to have no basis
from which to claim a right of compensation in British Columbia.
(2) LEVEL OF DOWNSTREAM RIPARIAN EXPLOITATION (assuming Article II does afford a remedy for the injured riparian at the
courts of the injuring riparian such that he is forced to take cognizance
of downstream costs) - the extent to which downstream claims will
influence upstream decision-making is obviously contingent upon the
quantum of those claims. In 1909 the U.S. economy was a more highly
developed and refined one than either Mexico's or Canada's. For this
reason the U.S. was most likely of the three nations to exploit her water
resources for irrigation and, most particularly, large-scale hydroelectric power development to serve her burgeoning industrial requirements. With such domestic requirements in prospect, it would be
intolerable to allow a citizen of another state to enjoin upstream works.
Thus Article II aimed at depriving the downstream interests any right
to such a claim of enjoinment. However with respect to downstream
damage claims there was little danger of their being so large as to
threaten the economic viability of the U.S. projects, given the comparative backwardness of the neighbouring economies. Thus such claims
as a right were not too expensive a concession for the U.S. to make in
face of the Canadian representations to preserve the common law's
rule internationally.
Article II thus seriously undermined Canada's position with respect to the
development of trans-boundary waters flowing into Canada. The common law
right to enjoin injurious upstream exploitation was decapitated, and the right to
damage compensation placed in jeopardy. 34 Even where such damage claims
were possible they were confined to then-existing riparian interests and could
not take account of future economic values potential to development.
32

Supra note 18, at 872-873.
3 RSBC. 1948 c. 361.
3
4 Armstrong et al., The ColumbiaRiver Dispute, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, vol. 1,
no. 1, June 1958 at 25.
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With these factors in mind, it is perhaps of interest to consider why Canada
acquiesced to the U.S. view of the international law. Sir Wilfrid Laurier may
have provided some insight on this question when he noted:
"I, for my part, have always believed that the Americans are very good and
very fair neighbours, but they always stand for their own view of things and in this
matter they did. They said: THIS IS INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WE DO NOT
ADMIT TO ANY OTHER INTERPRETATION THAN THIS ONE. IT WAS NO
USE TO ARGUE WITH THEM. We might have quoted Vattel and a number of
the other writers that we know of, but it would have no effect. Therefore we
took this course under the circumstances and said: Very well, if you insist upon
your view of it we want one law the same as your law and the consequences will
be the same35 on either side."5 6

It was apparent that Canada was in no position to bargain, s 7 for as no
doubt Laurier appreciated, Canada's exclusive upstream title was then of negligible value, and possibly of no future realizable value.as But the Canadian position with respect to acceptance of the treaty was unequivocally clear. It either
had to digest Article I and all that it entailed, or forfeit the goal of establishing
a permanent International Joint Commission to deal with future boundary water
issues which could replace the somewhat ad hoe antecedant International Waterways Commission. The latter irregularly could solve such issues as were brought
before it, and had developed no clear principles of dispute-settling or of bargaining rights, both of which were of some importance 9 to Canada.

I
IJ.C. DOCKETS PRE-COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY:
ARTICLE IE AND PRIOR APPROPRIATIONS
Article II, as a rule of law, gave absolute deference to the national jurisdiction. It was this feature which first attracted the United States to it; a fact
s5 By virtue of the greater U.S. development and the fact of U.S. damage claims being
more formidable, and the relative underdevelopment of Canada, the consequences were of
course by no means anywhere near the same. While both countries could develop upstream
to the exclusion of downstream interests as of right, for Canada it was likely to be a prohibitively expensive right where the riparian doctrine applied domestically, while for the
U.S., it was not apt to be expensive vis-h-vis Canadian damage claims. At any event her
greater development ensured higher relative benefits from exploitation making external
claims less serious in an economic sense.
N Supranote 18, at 912. The emphasis is my own.
87 The opposition leader made the point more succinctly in reply to the argument
of the Minister of Public Works:
"Mr. Pugsley: ... (the Hon. leader of the opposition) must recognize it was the
settled determination of the United States to maintain the sovereign right to do as
they pleased with the waters of their own country except so far as it might interfere
with navigation in the neighbouring country.
Mr. Borden: Does the minister mean that because the United States insisted that
that was the principle of international law we must admit at once that it was the
principle of international law?"
ss See supranote 35, The Columbia experience would imply this to be the case.
80 It was in fact so important in the eyes of those who negotiated the treaty for
Canada that it more than compensated for the many criticisms attached to Article 11 whose
consequences seemed to be very remote. An illustration of this attitude is to be found in
the somewhat defensive tenour of G.C. Gibbon's correspondence with the Prime Minister
over the course of his three-year long efforts in Washington (re: supra note 21).
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reflected in the early I.J.C. referrals subsequent to the installation of the I.J.C.
Yet the U.S. later discovered that Article II, if unconstrained by some modifying
doctrine, could occassionally operate detrimentally to their national interests.
The Souris River reference40 of January 15, 1940 was such an example.
(a) The SourisRiver reference
The Souris River is a small, but vitally important, irrigation source to
three riparian jurisdictions. Its source waters are in the province of Saskatchewan. From here it flows south to cross the forty-ninth parallel and into the State
of South Dakota. It then veers to the north to flow into the Province of Manitoba
to ultimately join the Assiniboine River mainstem. Manitoba's water supplies
from the river are thus contingent upon upstream uses both in the United States
and Saskatchewan. The latter, having in mind the water requirements of its
eastern neighbour, and that certain withdrawals were being made in the State of
North Dakota, limited its own consumptive uses to ensure the required supplies
downstream. However North Dakota began to impound large quantities of this
water to service a wild life reserve, thereby creating a shortage for the Province
of Manitoba. The resulting objections precipitated a joint reference to the Com41
sion under Article IX.
Saskatchewan argued that, because, by its own law, human water use requirements have priority, it would only release flows with regard to human uses
in both North Dakota and Manitoba. It would not deprive its own citizens of
badly needed water of provincial origin for a use not contemplated by the laws
of Saskatchewan (ie: wildlife refuges). The United States claimed on the other
hand that the withdrawals in North Dakota represented a prior appropriation
and that per the doctrine of priorappropriationit was not bound to make use
concessions to the interests of human users downstream and north of the
frontier.
While this case was not formally settled2 through the I.J.C., its issues are
perhaps of vital significance nonetheless. Here was a case where the United
States asserted a "first in time first in right" claim as both a downstream and
upstream sovereign simultaneously. While the latter claim was wholly consistent
with Article II (which imports priority to upstream uses regardless of which
riparian state is first in time to develop) the former position conflicted with
Article II. If the doctrine of prior appropriationsanctifies a prior use downstream as against future upstream development, the upstream power obviously
has something less than full jurisdiction and control. The United States thus
seemed prepared to claim against the Province of Saskatchewan a right which
she concurrently was prepared to deny Manitoba, and as she had in fact denied
the Mexicans thirty-five years previously. 43
40

Docket 41.
41 Supra note 4.

42
In April 1958 the two sections of the IJ.C. sent separate reports to the two governments recommending an interim apportionment of Souris flows between the two provinces
and North Dakota.
43
The Rio Grande dispute.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 9, No. 2

While unfortunately argument on the Souris River apportionment was curtailed by changing circumstances, 44 the Sage Creek reference of 194645 gave a
perhaps clearer picture of the changing American mood vis-h-vis downstream
riparian rights and concomitant liabilities upon upstream riparians.
(b) Sage Creek reference
Sage Creek is an almost insignificantly small watershed that rises in the
province of Alberta and flows into the state of Montana. The IJ.C. reference
was instigated by a single Montana rancher who alleged that upstream uses in
Alberta pre-empted the use of Sage flows for ranching purposes downstream.
Basically he attempted to assert the right of a common law riparian owner.
Hearings were held over a year later.4 6 Counsel for the U.S. claimed the
entire flow of the Creek under the doctrine of priorappropriation.In reply to the
contention by Canada that this was contrary to Article II, U.S. counsel alleged
that, first, the United States had at no time followed the Harmon Doctrine,47 and
second, that Article II's solitary purpose was to give Canada a cause of action in
the event of U.S. upstream development causing injury to her.48 Once again the
I.J.C. failed to answer these arguments knowing that to do so necessitated an
interpretation of Article II, and instead submitted an interim report to the
respective governments,49 and appointed the International Sage Creek Engineering Board50 which in turn recommended the establishing of an International
Sage Creek Board of Land Use. 51 The Sage Creek issue is as of yet unsettled.
Despite the U.S. arguments in the Souris and Sage Creek references, the
later Waterton-Belly Rivers reference52 evidenced a complete reversal of position by the American negotiators. For this reason, and for the detailed attention
paid to U.S. upstream interests, this reference 53 is perhaps one of the most
important to come before the I.J.C. 54
44
The U.S. planned to import up to 2.6 million acre-feet of Missouri R. water stored
behind the Garrison Dam for irrigation and Saskatchewan planned a reservoir on Long
Creek, a tributary of the Souris.
45 Docket no. 54.
40 The hearings were held at Havre, Montana, Nov. 10, 11, and 12, 1947.
47 Clearly the U.S. followed the Harmon Doctrinewhen they first asserted it against
Mexico, as well as when they included it within the Boundary Waters Treaty.
48 Such an argument was both obtuse and contradictory. If the common law
riparlandoctrine had not been supplanted by Article 11 Canada would have had a cause
of action. Article Ii's role was clearly not to confer a cause of action but to limit the same
so far as Canada was concerned. In particular it was to limit prior appropriation interests
to damage issues and make such prior appropriations defeasible to the upstream interests.

Thus Article I1 or the Harmon Doctrine opposes both the doctrine of prior appropriation

and the ripariandoctrine.
40 October 4, 1951.
50
January 26, 1949; the Board made a final report on August 10, 1950.
51 This Board reported on March 2, 1953.
52 The reference was submitted January 12, 1948.
53 Docket no, 57.
54 This was both the case when the referral was made, and may well be the case today
vis--vis re-establishing a rule of law with respect to Canadian-American trans-boundary
water.
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(c) Waterton-Belly Rivers reference
The Waterton and Belly Rivers rise in Montana and flow north across the
frontier with Alberta enjoying the downstream position. The province proposed
to construct works so as to devote the entire flows of each to domestic irrigation
needs. The United States requested an I.J.C. reference BECAUSE THE
FLOWS ORIGINATED FROM WITHIN THE STATE OF MONTANA.
Montana for its own part had never used the flows of either river, and as it
later appeared, had no future uses in prospect. When the U.S. realized this, a
survey was made of potential ways of making use of the flows on the American side of the boundary. A single plan was forthcoming known as the "AllAmerican Tunnel and Canal". Unfortunately, from both an engineering and
economic standpoint, the scheme proved impossible. Consequently the U.S.
offered the following alternative proposal: namely that Canada could have
title to the flows to both rivers if she would return one-half of this total flow
from her share of the nearby St. Mary's River 5 5 to a point on the boundary of
Montana (with transportation costs assumed in perpetuity by Canada).
Canada rejected the proposal making the argument below (summarized by
Bloomfield andFitzgerald).56
"Counsel for Canada stated that no use had ever been made in the past by the
United States of the waters of the Waterton and Belly Rivers, but that the only use

had been on the Canadian side of the boundary. Past use conserved the right for
future use both under international law and the precedents of the commission. There-

fore, the question was one of the apportionment of the7 remaining flow of the water in
the future, in the public interest of both countries."6

The Canadian response was essentially to argue the doctrine of priorappropriationin face of the clear re-assertion by the United States of Article II. It was
an unfortunate argument for Canada passed on the opportunity to clarify the
ambiguities created by the Souris and Sage -Creek references with respect to
upstream riparian rights and obligations. It also meant losing the opportunity of
greatly expanding the effect of Article II so as to give a paramount consumptive
title to flows to the upstream power; a position which would prove to be of great
potential value to Canada when the Columbia River complex came in issue
before the IJ.C. Instead Canada, by rejecting the U.S. arguments (re: known
as the Montana Doctrine), strengthened the doctrine of prior appropriation
which had the necessary concomitant result of weakening her own upstream
position respecting those trans-boundary waters which were of Canadian origin.
(d) The ColumbiaRiver reference
The Columbia River was first referred58 to the Commission on March 9,
1944 with a request by the two governments to investigate and recommend
further development. 59 The specific terms of reference were in part as below:
"It is desired that the Commission shall determine whether in its judgment
further development of the water resources of the river basin would be practicable
55

The apportionment of the St. Mary and Milk Rivers were specially provided for

by Article V1 of the Boundary Waters Treaty.
56 Bloomfield and Fitzgerald, Boundary Waters Problems: Canada and the US.,
Carswell, Toronto, 1958, supranote 5.

57 Ibid. at 178.
58 Docket no. 51.
59 Much of the lower Columbia was developed under Roosevelt's post-depression
reconstruction programme.
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and in the public interest from the points of view of the two governments, having
in mind (a) domestic water supply and sanitation, (b) navigation, (c) efficient
development of waterpower, (d) the control of floods, (e) the needs of irrigation,
(f) reclamation of wet lands, (g) conservation of fish and wildlife, and (h) other
beneficial public purposes.
In the event that the Commission should find that further works or projects
would be feasible and desirable for one or more of the purposes indicated above, it
should indicate how the interests on either side of the boundary would be benefited
or adversely affected thereby, and should estimate the costs of such works or projects,
including indemnification for damage to public and private property and the costs
of any remedial works that may be found to be necessary, and should indicate how
the costs of any project and the amounts of any resulting damage may be apportioned
between the two Governments."0o

From its source in Columbia Lake on the western slope of the Rocky
Mountains, the mainstem Columbia flows for a total of 1,220 miles reaching the
Pacific Ocean near Astoria, Oregon. The initial 480 miles are wholly within
the province of British Columbia. The river, in terms of annual discharge, is the
third largest in North America 6 ' yielding to the Pacific an average of 180 million
acre feet (hereafter referred to as MAF). However in terms of power production
potential 62 the Columbia's drop of 2652 feet from source to sea makes it the
continent's greatest energy source, representing at minimum 15% of that
hydroelectric potential available to the globe. 3 ,64 Of this amount 50% could
be developed within British Columbia, 65 despite only fifteen percent of the basin
as a whole lying in Canadian territory. 66
Both the Columbia and Kootenay rivers are fed from the rn-off of mountain snow packs. Thus over the course of a full year flow rates vary considerably.
In the case of the Columbia 120 MAP of the 180 MAF total discharge occurs
over the course of four months (ie: May, June, July, and August). At the time
of the Columbia River reference existing developments utilized approximately
one-third of the total discharge for hydroelectric generation on the U.S. reaches
of the river. The remaining two-thirds of the river's flow was forfeited each year
due to a lack of adequate upstream storage. There was however an attractive67
opportunity to create additional impounding facilities within the Canadian section which was, at the time, wholly unexploited. In addition neither the
Canadian nor American sections of the Kootenay (Kootenai) 66 were significantly developed.
00 Supra note 5, at 164-165.

01 James G. Ripley, The Columbia River Treaty, Engineering and Contract Record,
February, 1962.
62 Press release, April 1964, B.C. Government. Columbia River Development:
Proposed Hydroelectric Projects in Accordance with Requirements of the International
Treaty.
63
C.B. Bourne, Development of the Columbia River; Its International Legal

Aspects, Canadian Bar Association Meeting, 1957 at 90.
6

4 Including both developed and undeveloped.
The Canadian Section drops 1360 of the total 2650 feet of river head.
66 However the average Columbia discharge from the Canadian sources is 62.4 MAF
per annum, or greater than 30% of the river's total annual flow.
67 They were 'attractive' in the sense that the Canadian reaches of the Columbia
were characterized by: (1) deep gorges, and (2) relative undevelopment making cost
barriers low and maximizing storage facilities physically feasible.
65

68 Kootenai

is the U.S. spelling applying to their section of the river.
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Power reserves of the U.S. Pacific Northwest were quickly becoming overtaxed69 and the need of increased development was apparent. However, valley
conditions and the locations of existing developments made increased storage
on the U.S. section of the Columbia economically impractical. It was therefore
of importance to the U.S. that Canada begin exploiting its section of the river.
The Kootenay on the other hand could be harnessed in either Canada or the
United States, although backflooding costs would be lower in Canada. 70
The point of dispute that grew between Canada and the U.S. focused upon
the issue of control. Development was of obvious economic advantage to both
countries, but the type of developments that Canada undertook as the upstream
state would determine the distribution of benefit-sharing between the two entities. For example, if Canada were to maximize the hydroelectric potential of
its section of the Columbia, or the Columbia-Kootenay combined, the value of
the increased head control would be less to American power producers than if
Canada were to only construct single-utility storage dams. The latter arrangement would make it possible to time upstream flow releases so as to maximize
the efficiency of downstream power production. The former arrangement would
create some71 conflict between peaking power releases upstream and peaking
power demands downstream.
While there were numerous development sequences proposed for the upper
Columbia and Kootenay, only two are of concern to this paper. These were
known as ICREB72 sequences IXa and VII. Sequence IXa was the plan first
favoured by Canada. Sequence VII was in turn supported by the United States,
and provided the basis for the Columbia River Treaty of 1961.
Sequence IXa contemplated a Canadian diversion of the southern-flowing
Kootenay near Fort Steele73 and a re-routing of its headwaters across a halfmile strip of land 74 known as Canal Flats, and into the northerly flowing branch
of the Columbia. The integration was to be accomplished by way of three storage
structures; the Dorr and Bull River sites on the Kootenay, and the Luxor structure on the upper Columbia. This storage was in turn to ensure the maximum
amount of prime energy available to the major hydroelectric component of Mica
Creek, situated on the mainstem Columbia just after the point where the river
veers to the south.75 Sequence IXa was significant in the following respects:
(1) it maximized the generating potential in Canada via full development of the
most promising hydroelectric site of the upper Columbia, Mica Creek.
(2) sequence IXa maximized the volume of storage attributable to Canadian structures which meant that Canada could make the largest possible claim from the
U.S. downstream benefits thus afforded (ie: once the concept of downstream
benefit-sharing was established).
69

McNaughton, Problems of Development of InternationalRivers on the Pacific

Watershed
of Canada and the US., 5th World Power Conference, Vienna, 1956.
70

Owing to the relative lack of development in the Canadian Kootenay Valley.
71 Even if Canada were to develop hydroelectric power from all the new storage
there would still be an absolute advantage to U.S. power producers in as much as more
power could be produced downstream.
72 The International Columbia River Engineering Board.
73
Known as Canal Flats.
74 Ft. Steele consists of eight streets, one of which is a highway, and 22 odd buildings. This would seem to suggest that the cost of inundating it with flood waters is not apt
to be too significant, even if it means relocating each building for its "historic value!.
75 Just south of the Canoe River confluence with the Columbia.
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(3) sequence IXa allowed the retention of full Canadian sovereignty over the use
and control of the maximum amount of storage and thus made possible future
extra-basin diversions for consumptive uses.
(4) sequence IXa facilitated a maximum increment to absolute U.S. hydroelectric
capacity on the lower Columbia requiring a minimum of capital expansion via
allowing exploitation of Kootenay flows without having to dam the U.S. section
of that river.

In the case of Sequence VII there was to be no diversion of the Kootenay
into the Columbia. Instead the river would be exploited by way of a
$300,000,000 structure known as Libby76 in the state of Montana. Libby's
flood zone was to include 15,000 acres (over forty-two miles) 7 7 within the
Canadian section of the Kootenay Valley. The Libby project would ensure full
U.S. physical controF 8 over the regulation of the Kootenai flows. Sequence VII
did not include a Kootenay-Columbia headwater integration, or any significant
storage upstream from the Mica power site. Instead the bulk of the Canadian
storage was to be placed downstream near Castlegar, British Columbia via the
High Arrow damsite. High Arrow would ensure Canadian power production
would not conflict with U.S. power needs, downstream for it limited the storage
available to Mica to that volume impounded by the dam itself, and located the
balance of the Canadian storage at an altitude which made hydroelectric generation impractical. Thus Sequence VII was significant in the following respects:
Canadian
(1) Sequence VII demasculated Mica Creek ensuring either insignificant
power development on the upper Columbia, or none at all. 79
(2) Sequence VII gave the U.S. control over regulation of upper Columbia storages.
(3) Sequence VII gave the U.S. physical control over Kootenai flows with the
approval of the Libby project.
(4) Sequence VII excluded the extra-basin diversion proposals by Canada to the
prairie regions for irrigation consumption purposes.
(5) Sequence VII was consistent with the doctrine of prior appropriation and
inconsistent with Article I of the Boundary Waters Treaty.

Sequence VII and sequence IXa thus represent two wholly conflicting
positions with respect to which nation held control of the upstream storage. It
was quite natural therefore for Canada toadoptthelattersequence as its plan of
development. But in addition the Canadian negotiators80 took the position that,
as Canadian resources were being utilized to realize upstream storage, the U.S.
should return one-half of those downstream benefits arising as a consequence
of Canadian effort. The initial American response was to dismiss the Canadian
representation on the apparent assumption that domestic Canadian power requirements made upstream exploitation of the Columbia development inevitable. However two factors caused the U.S. view of the matter to change. The
first was a growing interest by British Columbia in the Peace River hydroelectric
78 See Libby Dam Reference discussed infra.
77 The depth of the floodwaters at the border is to be 150 feet.
78 If the doctrine of prior appropriation applies, physical control is equivalent to
legal control. See discussion infra.
70 With call to less storage, the potential generating efficiency of the Mica plant
dropped severely. There was some doubt, as a consequence, about machining it at all for
its output is apt to be too expensive to warrant the effort involved.
80 Under the chairmanship of General the Honourable A.G.L. McNaughton.
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and investidevelopment. 8' The second factor concerned Canadian discussions
82

gations regarding extra-basin diversions of Columbia waters.

The U.S. therefore acquiesced upon the Canadian claim to a share in the
downstream benefits in order to ensure that there would not be further postponement of upstream development. However there still remained the question
of future Canadian diversions under the cover of Article II so long as Canada
retained control over the river storages. Thus, over and above the concession of
an equal share of the downstream benefits, it was necessary for the U.S. to
undertake further steps to secure unrestricted control over the use of the basin
water resources in Canada. Towards this end the following arguments 3 were
developed by the U.S.:
(1) Article H1 refers to normal uses only-the U.S. contention here was that an
extra-basin diversion is an 'unreasonable use' of upstream waters, and is therefore beyond the scope of Article I. Instead the principle of "equitable apportionment" should obtain so as to ensure equitable sharing of the water resources
of a trans-boundary river basin.

The above argument however ignored the position that the U.S. had
earlier reached with reference to the Waterton and Belly Rivers.8 4 Here it was
submitted that the U.S. as upstream owner had the authority to divert the entire
flow of both rivers into another basin. There was no suggestion that such a use
was unreasonable, and that a doctrine of equitable apportionment should obtain.
(2) The doctrineof prior appropriation-theU.S. argued that existing U.S. developments on the Columbia and the contemplated expansion of Columbia facilities
on the U.S. section, as well as the Libby dam proposal on the Kootenai, gave
the U.S. a prior right to the entire flows of both rivers, unconstrained by any
rights Canada may have once had under Article 11. In other words the doctrine
of priorappropriationwas put forward as the guiding international rule- of law,
with Article I only conferring the right to divert in the absence of present or
contemplated downstream interests liable to injury thereby.

Except for the inclusion of future interests this argument was essentially

the same as that which the Americans presented in the Sage Creek reference.85
As noted in the earlier discussion of this case, the doctrineof priorappropriation
envisages something less than exclusive jurisdiction and control for the upstream
riparian and is therefore inconsistent with Article H which makes no reference
to appropriated or unappropriated waters. And yet in this regard the U.S.
earlier had rejected Canada's reference to a "first in time first in right" claim
with reference to the Waterton and Belly Rivers.
81

This project was being promoted by the Swedish Industrialist Axel Wenner Gren
and was a prima facie substitute power source.
82 There were two such diversions at issue. The first was the subject of a B.C.
Engineering Co. study which involved the re-routing of 10 MAF to 15 MAF of Columbia
head into the South Thompson River, and thence the mainstem Fraser where it would
supplement the storage capacity of structures proposed on that river. It would add in the
order of 12 million Kw's to the power production of the scheme.
The second proposal concerned the diversion of 6,000 cubic feet per second out of
the Dorr, Bull R., Luxor reservoir into the North Saskatchewan for the purpose of
augmenting prairie water supplies, and incidentally generating hydroelectric power on the
Eastern slope of the Rockies (ie: to help defray project operation costs).
83 Docket 51.
84 Docket 57.
8
5 Docket 54.
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The Canadian response to this second U.S. position was mixed. While there
was a refusal to accord projects under contemplation a right of prior appropriation, there was general acceptance of the principle that upstream Canadian
development should not impinge on the efficiency of existing U.S. developments
downstream. However it is not entirely clear whether this was intended as an
acceptance of the doctrine itself in a general sense, or a concession in the
interests of good international relations with no relevance beyond the particular
case of the Columbia. The chairman of the Canadian section of the I:J.C. at the
time80 adopted the view that a downstream interest injured by reason of development in Canada would have an enforceable damage claim in the Exchequer
Court (despite the B.C. Waters Act) per the remedy provision of Article I. On
the other hand the chairman was also quoted as saying:
"Whoever first appropriates water to a beneficial use has a prior right thereto
so long as he continues to exercise it. The appropriation must be of a specific amount
of water for a specific beneficial purpose and must be perfected in due course by
actually constructing the necessary works and putting the water to use." 8 7

Thus the Canadian view of the doctrine was somewhat ambiguous vis h vis
the question as to whether the prior right arising downstream imported a limitation upon upstream prerogatives per Article II or was confined merely to the
question of damages.
The development subsequently realized under the Columbia River Treaty
served to cast even greater doubt upon the question of whether the doctrine of
prior appropriationor Article II was the guiding rule of law. With the adoption of sequence VII Canada made neither intra nor extra-basin diversions, and
the Libby Kootenai project was approved. Both of these features were consistent with not only the doctrine of prior appropriation,as it related to existing
downstream development, but also with the U.S. view that the doctrine applied
to uses de futuro as well. While, as noted, there was evidence of Canadian
disapproval of this latter interpretation, the plan of development agreed to in
1961 did nothing to reflect such disapproval. Thus the treaty agreement deleted
the Canadian upstream use prerogatives and increased upstream obligations
vis t vis the protection of downstream interests to an extent that is as of yet
unclear.
Such a resulting confusion was unnecessary. The U.S. arguments and
reservations in the WanetaDam reference (which occurred simultaneously with
the Columbia-Kootenay river negotiations) eloquently demonstrated this point.
(e) Waneta Dam and Reservoir reference
The Pend Oreille River88 rises in the state of Idaho and flows to the north
and west through the neighbouring state of Washington and British Columbia.
A short distance after the river crosses the frontier it flows sharply to the west
to join the Columbia near the very point where the former crosses into the U.S.
An application was filed with the I.J.C. on May 22, 1951 on behalf of the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada seeking approval of the
8

0 General the Hon. A.G.L. McNaughton.
ST McNaughton, A.G.L. Statement before the Standing Committee on External

Affairs,
House of Commons, May 12, 1954, at 86.
88

The U.S. spelling applying to their section of the river.
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erection, and operation of the Waneta Dam on the Pend d'Oreille.5 9 As a direct
consequence of this work, three acres of the Cedar Creek Valley would come
under flood in the State of Washington.
The U.S. gave its approval so as to allow the project, subject to a right of
full compensation being provided all those suffering any injury, and subject to
the reservation that:
"... issuance (of the order of approval) should not be construed as waiving
or otherwise impairing in any degree the right of the United States recognized in
Article 11 of the Treaty, to construct, maintain, and operate such works as it may
consider necessary or desirable for the purpose of making the most advantageous
use reasonably practicable on its own side of the international boundary by diversion
for power purposes or otherwise of the waters of the Pend d'Oreille River as
regulated by headwater storage reservoirs lying entirely within the United States
and constructed wholly at the expense of the United States, or the expense of United
States interests." 90

Thus the United States, while taking a course of action contrary to the
Harmon Doctrine in fact, and consistent with the doctrine of prior appropriation, made the order of approval subject to a reservation that conveyed no
doubt that they did not thereby abrogate, or intend to abrogate, any of the
Article II rights. This Canada failed to emulate when approval was granted to
the Libby Kootenai project.

IV
THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY
The Columbia River Treaty has been variously referred to as everything
from a great international achievement to an unparalleled squandering of
Canadian resources and sovereignty. The last view in both the legal and economic senses would appear to have the most merit. This is the case for two
reasons. In the first case the Treaty caused Canada to abrogate the right to
make use of one of the world's most important and attractive power sources.
Second, the Treaty gave no recognition to the enormous consumptive value of
the Columbia basin water resources. 9' Further it can be argued that both such
losses may be perpetual and thus perhaps implies a new precedent basis to future
Canada-U.S. trans-boundary water negotiations.
In this regard Article IV, Section Five is of note. It reads as follows:
(5) ANY WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, in addition to the Canadian
storage, constructed in Canada after the ratification date shall not be operated
in a way that adversely affects the stream flow in the Columbia River within
Canada so as to reduce the flood control and hydroelectric power benefits which
the operation of the Canada storage IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OPERATING92PLANS IN FORCE FROM TIME TO TIME would otherwise produce."

The Canadian spelling.
Supranote at 47.
91
Which can be given a minimal value of $4,500,000,000 per annum given the
minimum value of water on the mainstem to have an imputed value of $39 per acre foot.
92
Article IV (Operation by Canada). The emphasis is my own.
89

90
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Section five of itself would appear to unequivocally prevent Canada from
altering flows such that regulation conflicted with current or future uses of U.S.
downstream power or flood control interests. This provision, prima facie, binds
Canada in a manner consistent with the doctrine of prior appropriationas
applied with reference to both present and future utilization. This derives from
the fact that, first, the U.S. section is in the process of increasing hydroelectric
capacity by way of expansion of existing facilities so as to make full use of the
new Canadian storages, and secondly, owing to this increased utilization, operating plans will over time appropriate the entire river storages.
Proponents 93 of the Treaty have, on the other hand argued that Article IV,
Section five is limited in effect by Article XIII, Section one, which purportedly
permits Canada to appropriate flows for consumptive uses by way of diversion.
(1) "Except as provided in this Article neither Canada nor the United States of
America shall, without the consent of the other evidenced by an exchange of
notes, divert for any use, OTHER THAN A CONSUMPTIVE USE, ANY
WATER FROM ITS NATURAL CHANNEL in a way that alters the flow
of any water as it crosses the Canada-United States of America boundary
within the Columbia River basin." 94

With reference to this argument a number of points are clear. In the first
place, the opening clause of Section five, Article IV refers to "any water resource
development", which in turn implies that the two sections are contradictory. In
the second place Article XIII is subject to termination. Article XIX which deals
with the Periodof Treaty is the relevant provision here: in particular its Section
four.
(4) "If the Treaty is terminated before the end of the useful life95 of the facilities
providing the storage described in Article IV (3) and if the conditions described
therein exist there, notwithstanding termination, Article IV (3), and VI (4)
and (5) REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL EITHER THE END OF THE USEFUL
CEASE
LIFE OF THOSE FACILITIES OR UNTIL THOSE CONDITIONS
9
TO EXIST, WHICHEVER IS THE FIRST TO OCCUR." 6

In addition Section one of Article XIX provides for the termination of the
treaty, subject to certain specific exceptions97 after the expiry date of sixty years.
Thus Article XIX Section four would preserve the effect of Section three Article
IV in the event of termination which would eliminate Section one of Article
XIII98 and with it Canada's purported right to make consumptive diversions.
(3) "For the purpose of flood control after the expiration of sixty years from the
ratification date, and for so long as the flows in the Columbia River in Canada
continue to contribute to potential flood hazard in the United States of America,
Canada shall, when called upon by an entity designated by the United States
of America for that purpose, operate within the limits of existing facilities any

93See Commons External Affairs Committee Hearings.
04

Article XIII (Period of Treaty). The emphasis is my own.
05 The Treaty's Article I, section (1) subsection (o) defined "useful life" as "the
time between the date of commencement of operation of a dam or facility and the date
of its permanent retirement from service by reason of obsolescence of wear and tear
which occurs notwithstanding good maintenance practices." In other words, "useful
life" could create a perpetual obligation by amounting to a perpetual appropriation given
that proper maintenance may preserve a structure indefinitely into time.
90
6Article XIX (Period of Treaty), Section (4). The emphasis is my own.
9
In particular Sections (2), (3), (4), and (5) of Article XIII, Article XVII, and
Article XIX.
08 Article XIX Section one is specific on this point.
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storage in the Columbia River basin in Canada as the entity requires to meet
flood control needs for the duration of the flood period for which the call is
made." 99

While, as an ethical question there can be little argument that Canada
should continue to provide flood control as the U.S. requires it beyond the life
of the main agreement, a sharp distinction can be drawn between the gratuitous
provision of the service and a formal treaty obligation to provide it. This is due
to the fact that flood control and hydroelectric benefits resulting from upstream
storage are not mutually exclusive. To the extent that the downstream nation
can, as of right, request upstream storage control for flood protection, it can also
ensure a greater total storage on the system which will be later translated into
a hydroelectric benefit (ie: when such storage is released as flood conditions
subside).
Thus it can be seen that the Columbia River Treaty failed to preserve
the applicability of Article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty with respect to

Canada's future use of the Columbiabasin's water resources. Infactthe Columbia
agreement may have been successful in eliminating Article II's status as a rule of
international law with respect to all Canada-U.S. transboundary waters. In this
regard Article XVII of the Columbia River Treaty is of some importance, for
it purports to guarantee a return to pre-existing rules of international law upon
the Treaty's termination. This however is no guarantee of the Harmon Doctrine,
for the U.S. can quite properly argue that they no longer recognized this principle prior to 1961 (re: the Sage River reference arguments by U.S. counsel). In
addition, as noted above, the appropriation ights under the Treaty continue
beyond the life of the main agreement by virtue of its Article XIX. Also Article
XVII provides for the cancellation: of the effect of Article II which implies that
its rights are created (ie: being subject to cancellation) rather than a hard and
fast rule. 100 It would therefore appear that the Treaty has been largely successful
in making the status of Article II ambiguous beyond recognition if not destroying
it entirely.
Despite the overwhelming evidence that the Columbia Treaty has wrought
permanent changes in Canada-U.S. trans-boundary water law, it has nonetheless
been asserted' 1 that the protocol to the Treaty definitively prevents the Treaty
from having precedent value by virtue of its twelfth provision:
(12) "Canada and the United States of America are in agreement that the treaty
does not establish any general principle or precedent applicable to waters
other than those of the Columbia River Basin and does not detract from the
application of the Boundary Waters Treaty, 1909, to other waters." 102
99 Article IV Operation by Canada.
100
The Law Respecting International Rivers as Developed by Canada and the
UnitedStates: A Survey and Recent Developments, John Loin McDougall, (unpublished).
01
' For example, "It has been suggested that the treaty would establish a precedent
for the development of international rivers which would restrict Canada's freedom to
develop rivers such as the Yukon in a manner most advantageous to this country in the
particular circumstances of each case. The Protocol states clearly that the Treaty does
not establish any such principle or precedent and effects no change in the application of
the Boundary Waters Treaty to other international rivers." The Columbia River Treaty and
Related Documents, Department of External Affairs et al., February 1964, Queen's
Printers, at 132.
102 Ibid., at 114.
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A number of factors are of note on this point. First, while Canada ratified
the protocol, the United States did not. Thus it does not have the force of law
within the U.S. An extreme view might be that it neither binds the U.S. internationally. Second, the provision is vaguely worded and third, it is ambiguous
for express terms of the treaty do affect the application of the Boundary Waters
Treaty as noted above.
To summarize the Columbia River Treaty has, ceteris paribus, given the
United States more or less complete control over the assets of the basin for the
following reasons:
(1) over the life of the treaty Canadian storages will be operated so as to
maximize hydroelectric benefits on the American side of the international boundary;
(2) most importantly, as a consequence of the U.S. control over the operation of Canadian storages, and her rights under Article XIII, Section
one, the United States is in a position to apply the entire storage
potential of the Canadian treaty projects to consumptive uses on their
own side of the line. This will in short permit them to perfect a
complete appropriation of water otherwise within the sovereign jurisdiction of Canada.
With respect to these two points it is important to note that as between
consumptive and hydroelectric benefits, the preponderate long term gains for
the U.S. as a consequence of the Treaty are within the former category. 03 The
value of this insured access to a new and vast source of consumptive storage did
not and will not go unnoticed in face of the enlarging regions of water deficiency
in the western United States. As one author suggested in this context:
["The United States is interested in water) because right now huge territories
are scraping the bottom of their water barrel. And within the next generation the
development of a major part of U.S. territory is likely to be choked off by drought...
[this] prompts us to check the list for the water-surplus areas....
Only the Pacific Northwest, Eastern Great Lakes and Central Pacific regions
remain as surplus areas on which the others could ever theoretically draw-not in
1980, but right now.., it's quite obvious that the Central Pacific area's surplus is
not big enough to provide anything but temporary relief for neighbours as waterhungry as the South Pacific. That leaves the Pacific Northwest and the Eastern
Great Lakes regions to carry most of the load. And Montreal and other cities relying on the eastern great lakes are now in difficulties. Obviously, they are more in a
position to need help than to give it.
All that remains is the Pacific Northwest. This region gets the big bulk of its
water from the Columbia River-28 per cent . . . coming from Canada. 'THE
UNITED STATES HAD THAT WATER IN MIND WHEN IT SIGNED THE
COLUMBIA TREATY WHICH CONSIDERING POWER ALONE WAS ... A
'SECOND BEST."'104

In terms of its legal effects the Columbia River Treaty represented the
culmination of three underlying trends of the international law with respect to
this area. These were in summary:
(1) a depreciation of the Harmon doctrine and/or Article II of the
Boundary Waters Treaty;
103 Indeed many noted American experts have sharply criticized the Treaty from
the point-of-view of the power benefits alone. While these gains were certainly not unimpressive, they were nevertheless less than optimal in terms of the alternative power development sequences available. cf J.V. Krutilla, The Columbia River Treaty: The Economics
of an 104
InternationalRiver Basin Development, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967.
J.S. Cram, Water: Canadian Needs and Resources, Harvest House, Montreal,
1968, at 137-13 8. The emphasis is my own.
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(2) a growth in stature of the competing doctrine of prior appropriation
(ie: and with it a new emphasis being placed upon the rights of downstream riparian owners); and
(3) a general tendency away from the hard-and-fast rules of treaty-based
international law towards a more flexible and individualistic case-bycase method of problem-solving. This approach has been called the
"doctrine of equitable apportionment".
Each of these three trends represents a worsening of the Canadian position. The Columbia River development presented an unequalled opportunity
for Canada to put to good use a principle of law which, if we are to believe Sir
Wilfrid Laurier, was thrust upon the country very much against his will. But in
1961 Canada instead acquiesced to the U.S. claims that the law was "ripe for
change" without appearing to have critically examined the costs to the national
sovereignty that might accrue as a consequence. Any Canadian losses with respect to the Columbia were the direct result of this failure.
It is suggested however in face of the present ambiguity there exists ample
room for a re-assertion of the basic precepts of the Boundary Waters Treaty
(re: the specifics of this contention are to be examined in section VIII below),
and that such a reversal in trend will further have two distinct advantages for
Canada so far as the particular case of the Columbia is concerned. These are:
(1) it will make it possible to assert sovereign control over Canadian
storages vis-4-vis the right to make consumptive withdrawals notwithstanding the fact that similar withdrawals may have been made downstream; and
(2) upon'expiration of the treaty, it will be possible for Canada to make
pre-emptory intra and extra basin diversions for hydroelectric and
combined hydroelectric-consumptive uses notwithstanding power and
other developments realized in the United States and otherwise protected by the doctrine of prior appropriation.
Insofar as the more general body of trans-boundary riparian relations
between the two countries are at issue it will allow Canada to definitively reject
the uncertain doctrine of equitable apportionment and the notion that it and
the Columbia River Treaty represents a recognition by Canada of the principle of a "continental water resource heritage". The implications of "equitable apportionment" in the context of both the Columbia and a CanadianAmerican water export agreement will be considered in the section to follow.

V
THE COLUMBIA AND THE DOCTRINE OF
"EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT"
The trend away from the strictly-defined rights of the Boundary Waters
Treaty as evidenced in the negotiations leading to the Columbia River Settlement
has been said to have earmarked the birth of a new precept of the international
law in effect between Canada and the United States. Professor R. Johnson of
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the University of Washington Law School for example has argued that as a result
of the ColumbiaRiver Treaty;
apportionment [has) emerged as the widely favoured principle.
"Equitable
This concept
embodying the notion of fairsharing, was extolled almost without
exception by lawyers, scholars, and statesmen on both sides of the border."' 05

That the question of apportionment is outside of the Canadian-American
treaty law has been clearly recognized by the two countries. For example the
1967 Report of the International Joint Commission 6nithe Co-operative
Development of the PembinaRiver Basin complained in this connection that:
"The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 provides no guidance in the matter
of apportionment of waters in rivers which cross the international boundary. Article
II states the principle that each country, along with its respective Provincial and
State Governments, normally retains 'exclusive jurisdiction and control over the
use and diversions' of all the upstream waters on its own side of the boundary...
The basis for the apportionment required to bring about this co-operative development [of the Pembina] MUST BE DERIVED FROM SOURCES OUTSIDE THE
TREATY."106

It has been suggested that the doctrine is in effect an integral part to what
is called the "drainage basin approach" to international river basin development, 0 7 and is aptly described by Article V of the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of
the Waters of InternationalRivers os which is concerned with the determination
of reasonable and equitable sharing of beneficial uses of an international drainage basin. Article V directs attention to the following factors in this regard:
(e)the economic and social needs of each basin state;
(f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin state;
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and social
needs of each basin state;
(h) the availability of other resources;
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin state may be satisfied, without causing
substantial injury to a co-basin state ....
109

By this statement of the principle it is rather difficult to distinguish equitable apportionment from the doctrine of prior appropriation with reference to
projects under contemplation (re: the interpretation asserted by the U.S. concerning its purported right to appropriate Kootenai flows for its planned Libby
project discussed, supra). In both cases insofar as the Columbia was concerned
their underlying object was to obtain Canadian recognition that the greater
demands for water and power in the southern portion of the basin gave rise to a
greater claim in equity to the assets of the basin as a whole, and that this fact
should rule rather than the strict sovereignty theory implicit to the Harmon
doctrine or Article II. Indeed it was contended by the United States that under
the doctrine of equitable apportionment U.S. future needs placed a limitation
upon Canada's right to make use of waters of domestic origin by way of
diversion.
105 R.W. Johnson, The Columbia Basin, The Law of InternationalDrainageBasins,
Garretson et al, New York University School of Law, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry,
New York,
1967, at 235.
10 GReport of the International Joint Commission on the Co-operative Development
of the Pembina River Basin, October 1967, at 30-31. The emphasis has been added.
107 C.B. Bourne, The Development of International Water Resources: The "Drainage
Basin Approach", The Canadian Bar Review, March 1969, Vol. XLVII no. 1.
108 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, adopted by
the International Law Association at the 52nd Conference held in Helsinki, August 20,
1966. The
International Law Association, 1967.
1 09Supra note 119, at 69.
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"A possible solution for the controversy [from the point-of-view of the United
States) is the use of the doctrine of "equitable apportionment" which requires that
the waters of a drainage basin be shared EQUITABLY between states in which the
basin is located. Under this doctrine Canada would have the right to make REASONABLE diverisions, but the proposed diversions are unreasonable and moreover, the
DOCTRINE DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE UNILATERAL DETERMINATION
OF THE REASONABLENESS OF DIVERSIONS."110

In light of this statement it can be seen that, not only are the doctrines of
prior appropriation and equitable apportionment similar, but in many cases the
latter may prove to be in fact a harsher principle than the former from the pointof-view of the upstream riparian country. This owes simply to the fact that in its
usual sense the doctrine of prior appropriation limits the right-of-use of the
upstream state to the extent of presently-existing downstream development.
Equitable apportionment on the other hand would more greatly restrict the
right-of-use upstream in a large number of cases inasmuch as the downstream
state must only show greater need regardless of the presence or absence of river
works. It is thus something of a paradox that Canada should in one breath
support equitable apportionment and yet be on record as having, on a number of
occasions, been opposed to the doctrine of prior appropriation. And yet this
has proven to be precisely the case as indeed Professor Johnson contended.
During the course of the early negotiations of the Columbia a University of
British Columbia-sponsored seminar concerning the subject of International
River Basin Development' published the following conclusions:
(1) the theory of strict territorial sovereignty should be rejected on the grounds of
being too inflamatory and an impediment to co-operative development;
(2) the doctrine of prior appropriationshould be rejected as it facilitates development at too great a cost to the undeveloped;
(3) equitable apportionment should be adopted for the reason of providing each
co-riparian
a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial use of a river
basin. 2

Significantly enough the Seminar did not discuss, much less define, the
principles of "reasonableness" and "equity" that should govern beyond saying
that each case would be contingent upon its own particular facts, and nor did
the group attempt to distinguish in anything other than name the various interpretations of the doctrines of prior appropriation and equitable apportionment.
More recently the IJC has recommended the application of the principle
with respect to the Pembina River Basin in its 1967 report referred to supra.
Here it was maintained that an equitable apportionment could be obtained
where:
"....the ratio of the sum of the separable economic gains to the cost of the joint
project works is the same for each participating country."" 3

Unfortunately this formulation of the principle does not make it any more
certain, or any more easy to distinguish from the principle first propounded by
the U.S. in its Libby dam application. There are two basic reasons that this is so:
"o Supranote 5, at 43. The emphasis is my own.
11
'
See J.D. Chapman, The InternationalRiver Basin, Proceedings of a Seminar on
the Development and Administration of the International River Basin held under the
auspices of the Regional Training Centre for United Nations Fellows, University of British
Columbia, Publications Centre, U.B.C., 1963.
112 Ibid., at 21-25.
113 Report of the InternationalJoint Commission on the Co-operative Development
of the PembinaRiver Basin, October 1967, at 29.
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(1) to ratio the sum of the separable economic gains to the cost of the joint
project works such that they are the same for each country does not
affect the question of how the benefits of development should be
apportioned necessarily. The ratios can be made comparable by
restricting the scale of the project in that jurisdiction having the lowest
benefit prospects, and maximizing the project scale in that jurisdiction
having the higher benefits. IN OTHER WORDS THE CONDITION
SET OUT BY THIS PRINCIPLE CAN BE EASILY FULFILLED
BY THE PROCESS OF COST APPORTIONMENT AS IT CAN
BE BY BENEFIT APPORTIONMENT.
(2) the need for water use will be greater in the more developed area
because of the greater demands placed upon the land. Thus the opportunities for economically-rewarding use in any future development
will concentrate in developed regions, and BASN-WIDE OPTIMIZATION WILL OCCUR THROUGH MAXIMIZING THE
FLOW OF BENEFITS OF DEVELOPMENT TO THE AREA OF
GREATEST NEED IN THE BASIN (i.e. a maximized appropriation
of benefits past and future).
Thus, from the point-of-view of Canadian sovereignty the UIC's statement
of the application of the doctrine is less than satisfactory. It would appear to
amount to little more than an advanced restatement of the doctrine of prior
appropriation; advanced in the sense that it not only allows past utilization to
perfect a claim to basin resources, but in that it appears to suggest that future
development should be undertaken so as to distribute the benefits in favour of
those areas in greatest need. As it is defined, equitable apportionment represents
continental resource allocation (i.e. insofar as it ignores political boundaries)
and is destructive of Canadian sovereignty wherever Canada enjoys the position
of upstream riparian.
In response to this shift of the international law it has been suggested that
Canada has formally acquiesced to the principle that waters north of the fortyninth parallel are properly the heritage of the continent as a whole, and
not exclusively Canada's. Since 1964 there have been a series of water-export
studies produced that exemplify the grounding premise of equitable apportionment; namely, that the paramount property right to water is vested in that party
whose needs are greatest.

VI
THE IMPENDING ISSUE OF WATER EXPORT
This section will examine three export proposals: the North American
Water and Power Alliance (or simply, NAWAPA), the Central North American Water Project (or CeNAWP), and the Great Replenishment and Northern
Development Canal (or more briefly, the GRAND Canal scheme). In the
case of each of these plans there are several common points of comparison,
and many more common points of criticism. To avoid needless repetition, the
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origin, nature, and general response in Canada and the United States towards
the three plans will be considered, followed by a critical discussion of the failings, both legal and economic, of these and other massive water diversion
schemes.
(a) The North American Water andPowerAlliance

The scope of the North American Water and Power Alliance is nothing
short of breathtaking. Its backers contemplate a water distribution system that
would virtually cover the length and breadth of the continent. Ostensibly the
scheme is the product of the Ralph M. Parsons Company, a worldwide engineering firm based in Los Angeles and New York City. But in actual fact their
"concept" is not a very original one. The essentials of NAWAPA were advanced
a number of years prior to the Parsons Company's studies in a "quasi-evangelistic publication entitled, "Technocracy." 114 The present role of the Parsons
Company in the scheme is itself a cause for some uncertainty. Some of the
literature that discusses the plan refers to them as the "backer""25 of the
proposal, while in other cases they are referred to as mere "sponsors""16 acting
for another earlier organization of the same name as the project. In either case
NAWAPA has benefited from a substantial measure of public support within
the United States. A special subcommittee of the U.S. Senate's Committee on
Public Works" 7 was formed to examine the project under the chairmanship of
Senator Frank E. Moss, a Democrat from the State of Utah. Senator Moss was
also responsible for a concurring "NAWAPA Resolution" which he entered
into the CongressionalRecord as follows:
"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), that it is
the sense of the Congress that - (1) the President of the United States should refer
the matter of the diversion of surplus Arctic water to the International Joint Commission with the request that an economic and engineering feasibility study be made
and that the respective governments be informed of the results of such study by
December 31, 1966; and (2) the President of the
United States should invite the
government of Canada to join in such referral.""18

Apart from the political significance of this rather excited response to
NAWAPA, the resolution is of note on two points. First, it called for an
economic and engineering analysis to be completed in slightly more than a year's
time.

It is perhaps being rather optimistic to suppose that a project that would
at best take thirty years to complete, and cost in the vicinity of $100 billions
114

Larratt Higgins, Address to the Woodsworth Foundation Conference on Con-

tinentalism versus Nationalism, Resource Development: Integration or Cooperation,
November 12, 1966, at 6.
115 Senator Frank E. Moss, The Water Crisis, Praeger, New York, 1967, at 243.
116 I.S. Cram, Water: CanadianNeeds and Resources, Harvest House, Montreal,
1968, at 140-141.
117 Special Subcommittee on Western Water Development. Apart from Senator
Moss the Subcommittee's membership included Ernest Greening (Alaska), Lee Metcalf
(Montana), Gaylord Nelson (Wisconsin), Hiram Long (Hawaii), and James Pearson
(Kansas). The revised report of the Subcommittee was printed in January 1966 and was
entitled "A Summary of Water Resources Projects, Plans, and Studies Relating to the
Western and Midwestern United States."
118 CongressionalRecord, Senate, September 1, 1965, at 21780-21789.
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based upon 1964 prices," x9 could be appraised in so short a period of time. In
this respect, the resolution can be interpreted as one barometer of the possibly
naive enthusiasm that the scheme has been greeted with as well as perhaps
being a reflection of the growing urgency of the U.S. water crisis.
Second, the resolution refers to what it terms "surplus Arctic water." In
respect of this point NAWAPA's impact upon "Arctic waters" is minimal. The
rivers to be diverted in the main flow from the Canadian Western Cordillera
region into the Pacific Ocean. Further, the notion that such waters are in any
event "surplus" is probably a specious premise, although more will be said of
this below.
The underlying object of NAWAPA is rather simple. The scheme's proponents would have Canada divert anywhere from 120-250 M.A.F. from the
western divide through the Rocky Mountain Trench to areas of need to the
south and east. The principal Canadian drainage basins to be tapped include
those of the Yukon, Tanana, Laird, Peace, Columbia, Fraser, Athabaska,
Smoky, Oldman, Saskatchewan, Qu'Appelle, Assiniboine, Nelson, Albany,
Abitibi, and Kaniapiskan Rivers. The Parsons Company admits that ".... literally all of the inland rivers of British Columbia, except the Thompson are [to
beJ120 used in NAWAPA."'' 1 Approximately eighty-two per cent of this water,
almost all of which is of Canadian origin, would be diverted to serve needs in
the United States. Canada would retain roughly eighteen percent (at maximum) 22 for domestic use.
Over and above the delivery of Canadian waters to American markets,
NAWAPA would purportedly create the following secondary benefits:
(1) A continental navigation system connecting the Pacific coast, James Bay, the
Gulf of Mexico, and the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence navigation complex;
(2) The generation of anywhere from 100,000,000 to 150,000,000 KW of hydroelectric power for use in the United States, Canada and Mexico;

(3) The stabilization of the levels of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River
system.

In total the plan would involve a huge drainage area of approximately
1,300,000 square miles. The material demands of NAWAPA are equally
enormous. For example, it would use some 40,000,000,000 tons of copper
and aluminum, necessitate the movement of 45,000,000,000 cubic yards of
earth, require 500,000,000 cubic yards of cement, and 70,000,000 tons of
steel. The project would necessitate an outlay of $5,000,000,000 for construction equipment and tools, $7,500,000,000 for engineering, $25,000,000,000
for construction
labour and $10,,000,000,000 for power and related facility
3
equipment.l
110 These are the Parsons Company's own estimates, Cf. NAWAPA, North American
Water12and
Power Alliance, Brochure 606-2934-19, The Ralph M. Parsons Company.
0
The insertion is my own.
121 NAWAPA: Summary Report for Dominion of Canada, The Ralph M. Parsons
Company, Los Angeles, New York, Brochure No. 606-2934-22, July 8, 1964, at 15. The
insertion
is my own.
122
Supra note 126.

128 The FinancialPost, May 2, 1964.
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The Parsons Company's tentative allocations of the consumptive and
power benefits as between the various provinces and states of Canada, the
United States and Mexico is:
NAWAPA: WATER AND POWER ALLOCATIONS
PROVINCE

Yukon
Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
P.Q.
TOTALS
STATE
Washington
Alaska
Montana
N. Dakota
S. Dakota
Minnesota
Michigan
Wisconsin
Illinois
Indiana
Ohio
Pennsylvania
N.Y.
Texas
Oklahoma
Kansas
Colorado
Nebraska
Idaho
Wyoming
Nevada
Oregon
Utah
California
Arizona
New Mexico
STATE
Baja California
Sonora
Chihuahua
TOTALS

WATER
(acre feet)

IRRIGATED
LANDS (acres)

POWER

12,500,000
12,500,000

5,000,000
5,000,000

25,000,000

10,000,000

3,000,000
30,000,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
1,000,000
2,000,000
1,000,000
43,000,000

4,600,000
5,400,000
5,400,000

2,146,000
2,146,000
2,146,000

5,000,000
5,000,000
5,000,000
2,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
2,000,000

6,400,000
6,400,000
6,400,000
6,400,000
6,400,000
2,500,000
2,500,000
11,700,000
5,800,000
7,000,000
9,300,000
5,800,000
2,300,000

4,668,000
2,314,000
2,785,000
3,718,000
2,324,000
926,000

4,600,000
5,400,000
6,900,000
13,900,000
6,900,000
7,500,000

1,858,000
1,859,000
2,758,000
5,598,000
2,758,000
3,021,000

4,000,000
1,400,000
4,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
5,000,000
3,000,000
2,000,000

2,300,000
12,300,000
5,000,000
19,600,000

930,000
4,880,000
2,012,000
7,822,000

1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
3,000,000*

1,000,000

*These allocation figures appeared in a Parsons Company newsletter. As far as
Canada is concerned, the totals have little reliability for the 25 MAF and the
43,000,000 KW have both been changed in later Company publications to 22 MAF
and 30,000,000 KW respectively.
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Canadian reaction to NAWAPA was rather mixed. At one extreme, Professor Trevor Lloyd of McGill suggested that:
"Its immediate objective appears to be, as the phrase goes, 'maximize' the amount
of engineering construction possible during the next thirty years at a time24when
the industry may be less active than it has during the last quarter century."1

Some Canadian politicians responded less cynically. Prime Minister Pearson suggested to an American audience that the exporting of water could be as
important to Canada as the export of wheat or oil.125 Jack Davis, then the
member of Parliament for Coast-Capilano, and later to become Parliamentary
Secretary to Prime Minister Pearson, advocated that Canadians think in terms
of "a Great Northern Water Plan" to divert Canadian waters to the areas of
need to the south and east of both countries. 126 There was dissent however
within the ranks of government. Arthur Laing, who was then Minister of
Northern Affairs and National Resources, was quoted2 7 as being opposed to
the scheme. In British Columbia, Premier Bennett referred to NAWAPA's
plan to divert his province's water resources as "ridiculous".12 8
In short, reaction in Canada to NAWAPA ranged between extremes.
The solitary point about which there was more or less a consensus was the
notion that the scheme was premature with respect to a number of feasibility
questions that demanded prior investigation, 2 9 and in relation to the estimate
of the amount of water that might be available from Canada. Canada at this
point had not undertaken an inventory of domestic water supplies, and was
therefore not in a position to assess that quantity which might be "surplus" to her
long-term requirements. Thus, NAWAPA, after a flurry of initial excitement
and international controversy lapsed into temporary oblivion.
But it would be an error to conclude that the demise of NAWAPA in terms
of public attention implies the demise of the more general issue of massive water
export. If the Parsons Engineering Company accomplished anything with
NAWAPA it was to open up the question of large-scale diversions and keep it
current since 1964. In this context, NAWAPA was the mere antecedent of
progressively more refined versions to follow. Two such proposals that have
subsequently appeared are described infra.
(b) The CentralNorth American Water Project
The Central North American Water Project is a good illustration of the
gradual sophistication of the Parsons concept. But it also is of interest for the
additional reason that its author is the Canadian head of the federal Department
124 Professor Trevor Lloyd as cited by Larratt Higgins, supra, note 126, at 7, and
originally appearing in A Water Resource Policy for Canada, Canadian Geographical
Journal, July 1966.
125As reported in the New York Times, Sunday, October 17, 1965.
126 Jack Davis, The Great Northern Water Plan, address to the 52nd General
Conference, Pacific Northwest Trade Association, Prince George, B.C., September 14,

1964.

127 "Quest for Cool Clear Water is a Multibillion Dollar Business", New York
Times, September 12, 1965, at 12.
128 Address to the Royal Society of Canada, A.G.L. McNaughton, as cited in Claude
E. Dolman, Water Resources of Canada,The University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1967,

at 17.

120

Ibid., at 17 and passim.
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of Energy, Mines and Resources, Water Resources Planning Branch, E. Roy
Tinney. In an article which appeared in the September 1967 Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientist, he suggested that NAWAPA was an expensive and needlessly
crude means of exporting Canadian water, and moreover, impracticable in
terms of the development of low-cost hydroelectric power. He further contended
that not enough groundwork had gone into NAWAPA to permit even a certain
statement about its feasibility, 30 and that in any case there were prima facie
superior alternatives at hand (which should be subjected to detailed analysis
before NAWAPA should be considered) having in mind the following three
factors:
(1) The areas of greatest demand/need for water on the continent;
(2) The natural geography of the continent vis-h-vis the most optimal export route;

and

(3) The need to minimize the Canadian resources (e.g. land, existing settlements,

and industries, etc.) that must be foregone to create a diversion system through
which water can be exported.

In light of these criteria, it was argued that the so-called "Central North
American Water Project" deserved some consideration. CeNAWP, comparatively-speaking, minimizes the violence done to the underlying geography to
create the diversion system insofar as the engineering opportunities inherent to
the natural features of the land have been maximized. For example, unlike
NAWAPA, CeNAWP avoids the necessity for massive artificial reservoirs,
and instead would exploit some 50,000 square miles' 31 of natural lake surface
for its storage requirements. These lakes (which include Great Bear Lake,
Great Slave Lake, Lake Athabaska, and Lake Winnipeg) would be connected
from north to south by a series of linking canals where necessary. By this means,
Tinney suggests that some 800,000 square miles of drainage could be exploited,
making it possible to deliver some 150 M.A.F. of Canadian water to the United
States per annum. 132 The pumping required to expedite this result, when compared with the similar demands of the Parsons scheme, are minimal, for once
again, CeNAWP would derive full advantage from the fact that the topography
from the Arctic to Lake Winnipeg is almost virtually flat, and in addition the
relative value of the arable land to be flooded is diminutive in comparison with
the real estate that would be pre-empted by NAWAPA.
Finally, CeNAWP is more efficient as a water distribution system inasmuch as it redirects the continent's water directly to the regions in greatest need.
Very approximately, these are as follows:
(1) A 300-mile-wide strip which runs parallel to the eastern foothills of
the Rocky Mountains commencing in the State of Montana and
extending in an arc to the West Texas region;
(2) A 125-mile-wide strip beginning at El Paso, Texas and following the
Mexican frontier westward to the Techachapi Mountains in California;
(3) Northeastern Nevada and the Great Salt Lake region of Utah;
(4) The populated centres of Southern California.
130

Although he concluded that there was no reason to suppose that it encountered

insurmountable problems, and that therefore it could in all probability be built.
131 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, September 1967, at 21.
132 Ibid., at 23.
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As was true of NAWAPA, rather extravagant claims are made about the
potential rewards to be derived from CeNAWP. It is contended, for example,
that Canada would obtain the following benefits:
(1) A navigation system which would extend from the Arctic Ocean to the Great
Lakes;
(2) -The reclamation of extensive low-lying north central Canadian marshlands;
(3) Relief from the flood hazards frequently arising in these same areas;
(4) New power sources over the course of the Churchill to Lake Winnipeg drop,
Lake Winnipeg to Superior drop, and incremental power over the length of
the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence drop;
(5) Stabilization of Great Lake levels;
33
(6) New water and surplus power for export to the United States

There has been little if any public discussion of CeNAWP in Canada or
in the United States. One can only assume that, to the extent that it is an
advancement upon the original NAWAPA concept, it would be supported on
both sides of the border by most persons who favoured the original Parsons
Company proposal. A third water export study, however, has engendered
considerably more commentary, although its scope is more restricted than has
been true of either NAWAPA or CeNAWP.
(c) The GreatReplenishmentand NorthernDevelopment Canal
The Great Replenishment and Northern Development, or GRAND Canal
plan was conceived by a Sudbury engineer, Thomas W. Kierans. The scheme
itself is, by the admission of its author, rather tentative and was advanced only
to ".

.

. stimulate the interest of all governments in setting up authoritative

benefit-cost studies.' 3 4 The proposal is aimed at fulfilling two objectives: first,
the control of the Great Lake levels and St. Lawrence River flow, and second,
the delivery of exportable water from the Canadian north to the United States.
The method is to reverse the flow of a sizeable portion of the James Bay watershed run-off just before it would "... otherwise be lost to the sea and [divert]

it to the Great Lakes."' 3 5

The GRAND Canal plan at first blush appears to offer a rather imaginative solution. It is proposed that the flows of the Pontax, Rupert Broadback,
Nottaway, and Missisicabi Rivers be collected in a "fresh water reservoir" in
the southern extremity of James Bay. Integration of this reserve and the salt
water of the Bay would be prevented by means of an isolating dyke system
linking the eastern and western shores of the Bay with what appears to be
Charlton Island. 8 6 The waters impounded by this catchment would be redirected southwards by a combination pump and gravity fall system through
the Harricanaw River whose entire flow would be reversed. This water would
133 Ibid.,

at 23.
134 Objectives and limitations, Great Replenishment and Northern Development
Canal: Provincial,National, InternationalMulti-Purpose Benefits, published by Thomas
W. Kierans, Sudbury, Ontario, at 1.
135 Ibid., at 1.
180
The map of the project region supplied by the Kierans Engineering Company
does not identify the island by name. It is positioned roughly in the same locale as is
Charlton Island but is shown as being more of the dimensions of Akineiki Island lying to
the northwest.
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in turn be diverted to the east and west via the Ottawa and French Rivers and
thence to the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence system.
The GRAND Canal plan would exploit a drainage of some 64,000 square
miles and involve a total run-off of 78,000 cubic feet per second. This, in other
words, would involve more than fifty percent'3 7 of the fresh water drainage into
the lowerportion of James Bay.
Because the collection pool of fresh water is in the Bay itself, Kierans
argues that a southern diversion can be made:
".... without depriving anyone in Canada now or in the future of the natural flow
of any rivers since the fresh water
1 38so collected would be obtained 'just before it
would be otherwise lost to the sea'."

Kierans argues that the fresh water in issue is merely "recycled" by the
GRAND Canal, and implicitly that, as this is an otherwise "lost" resource, its
sale should pose first of all no loss to Canada, and second of all, no threat to
the national sovereignty.
The estimated construction costs of the GRAND Canal plan range between
a low of $1,200,000,000 and $2,000,000,000 for a system which would initially
only deliver 24,000 cubic feet per second.'3 9 From the James Bay fresh water
catchment to the height of land lying to the south, eight damsites are needed
whose costs range from $50,000,000 to $85,000,000140 as well as the east and
west dykes in the Bay. Approximately 2,000,000 horsepower would be needed
to fulfill the project's pumping requirements on the Harricanaw River. Over
the course of the natural fall of the land to Lake Huron a number of additional
project works are contemplated including two channels, widening of water
beds, pumping facilities, and a series of level control dams.
It is maintained by Kierans that the GRAND Canal offers Canada the
following benefits:
(1) Profit from the sale of fresh water to some areas of water deficiency in the
United States;
(2) Hydroelectric power from the fall of new water into the Great Lakes/St.
Lawrence complex;
(3) A barge canal from James Bay south to the Great Lakes and lower Ottawa
River;141
(4) Economic development of the eastern north;' 42
(5) Flood and drought control of the Great Lakes, St. Lawrence and Ottawa Rivers;
43
(6) Reduction of pollution in the Great Lakes, St. Lawrence and Ottawa Rivers.1
miles.

137 The total drainage area served by the Lower James Bay region is 110,000 square

'138Ibid., at 32.
19 Ibid., at 47.
140 Ibid., at 50. The height of land is roughly 960 feet above James Bay.
141 Kierans suggests that this will be of low cost and for this reason will assist in the
development of the large iron ore reserves of the James Bay area.
142 Thomas W. Kierans, The GRAND Canal Concept, an address, Sudbury, 1960.
143 GRAND Canal Benefits to Canada,T.W. Kierans. There are in total, 18 Canadian "benefits" listed in other Kierans publications, many of which are at best marginal by
this definition and most of which are disputable in any case. For example, one suggested
benefit is the elimination of ". . . undesirable tensions between Canada and the United
States." Allowing for an American claim as against waters of Canadian origin would
seem arguably to set off the risk of more undesirable tensions than it would relieve. To
call this a "benefit" is tantamount to suggesting that sovereignty itself should be given up
for the obvious benefit of improving foreign relations.
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While the GRAND Canal proposal has had a longer history of public
commentary than either NAWAPA or CeNAWP, because of its relatively
smaller scale it perhaps has not provoked the same degree of extreme reaction.
On April 5, 1960 the member of Parliament for Fort William, Ontario, proposed
a federal study of the project be undertaken and it was in consequence briefly
considered by the Parliamentary Committee on Mines, Forests, and Waters.
Kierans himself appeared before this body to advocate more intensive study
of his proposal. The 144
M.P.'s for Chapleau Quebec and Pontiac Temiskaming
also spoke in support.
A number of non-governmental organizations have also endorsed the
proposal to give the plan more detailed study. Among these can be included
the North Eastern Ontario Development
Association and the Quebec and
145
Ontario Chambers of Commerce.
The GRAND Canal drew rather strong support (as one might suppose)
in the United States. The Great Lakes Commission of the United States passed
a resolution in 1961 calling for studies of similar diversion proposals. 14 Senator
Alex Wiley of Wisconsin lent his support to such a study as did Governor
Kerner. Predictably enough, Senator Moss also has counted himself as being
among the plan's advocates. The GRAND Canal, he suggests, would, were it
possible to iron out the international difficulties, provide a valuable precedent
for NAWAPA or some modified' 47 version of it.148
In summary, the three water export schemes described above suggest that
massive continental water planning has promise of becoming a critically important issue of Canadian-American relations over the course of the immediate
decade. All of the necessary elements for this growth are present. First, is the
widespread alarm being felt in the United States in the face of what appears to
be dwindling per capita water supplies, and the deteriorating quality in many
cases of this same limited resource. Second, is the rather enthusiastic support
given to export proposals such as NAWAPA from within the United States
revealing perhaps a measure of desperation in the face of the internal problems
of quality and quantity scarcity. Third, the ambivalence shown to date by
Canada vis-L-vis the export issue may possibly encourage the Americans to
press for an early agreement before attitudes in Canada have a chance to
harden and the presently favourable negotiation opportunity passes. Fourth
as shown by NAWAPA, CeNAWP, and Kierans' GRAND Canal plans, an
impressive amount of thought has already been devoted to the question, and
fifth, inventories of accessible water suplies are now being conducted in
Canada in an attempt to estimate domestic requirements over the foreseeable
future. When all of these factors are taken together, it would seem probable
that the issue of continental water transfers is rapidly moving from the drawing
board stage to that of the negotiating table.
144 Supra,
145
146

Ibid.
Ibid.

147 The GRAND Canal would pre-empt the necessity for having NAWAPA's
western feeder system into the Great Lakes and thus some modification would be unavoidable. 8
14 Supra, note 115, at 248.
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However, two additional features present possibly overwhelming difficulties for Canada as the exporting nation. First, it would seem that the growing
pressure for some form of continental water pact potentials a situation whereby
Canada will be committed to an export agreement whose economic, social, and
ecological consequences remain unappreciated. Second, and perhaps more
seriously in terms of preserving the sovereign integrity of the country, this same
rush to strike such an agreement may cause Canada to overlook the very real
dangers that arise from the ambiguities in the present trans-boundary water law
in force between the two countries which have been described above. Both
factors as they relate to the question of water export in the future will be
discussed in the succeeding sections.

VII
WATER EXPORT AND SOME ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
ECOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Water diversions of the magnitude contemplated by any of the schemes
discussed above introduce economic, social and ecological intricacies which
demand careful and complete attention. NAWAPA, CeNAWP, and the
GRAND Canal plan, as presently described by their respective proponents
overlook many of these complexities, and to this extent the potentials for
economically rewarding water transfers appear to have been exaggerated.
The difficulties occasioned by the schemes divide into four general categories: namely, problems that relate to the geographical backdrop of the
diversion areas, oversights in cost estimates which tend to distort the already
rather crude benefit-cost calculations, ecological variables, and the presumption made that Canada will be able to successfully negotiate a sliding scale
recapturing provision that will preserve its sovereignty over the waters to be
diverted. The specifics of each of these general categories has been detailed
infra.
(a) GeographicalOversights
Of the three schemes discussed, NAWAPA encounters the most significant
problems of geography, so many in fact that one critic was moved to suggest
that:
"Clearly we have here an exercise in sophomore civil engineering which has received
far greater attention than it ever deserved. It underlines the danger, all too familiar

to geographers, of allowing the drawing
office to replace acquaintance with the land
and the people as they really are.' 149
One example is the Parsons' planners' apparent failure to consider the
value of arable land in mountainous British Columbia. 15 0 NAWAPA would
149 Professor Trevor Lloyd, as cited by General the Hon. A.G.L. McNaughton,
address to the Royal Society of Canada, Water Resources in Canada,edited by Claude E.

Dolman, University of Toronto Press, 1967, at 18. Supra note 128.

150 See NA WAPA: Summary Report for Dominion of Canada,the Ralph M. Parsons

Company, Los Angeles and New York, Brochure 606-2934-22, July 8, 1964, at 34-36, and
more generally, NAWAPA: North American Water and Power Alliance, The Ralph M.
Parsons Company, Los Angeles, New York, Brochure 606-2934-19, undated, at 3-10.
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involve the inundation of much of this precious territory. 1' 1 Another example
can be found in the scheme's ambitious navigation system. It again appears to
reflect rather careless research, for most of the system lies in northern regions
that have less than fifty frost-free days per annum. 15 2 This naive view of the
underlying geography is also evident in the proposal to create a navigation
connection between James Bay and the Great Lakes, for the tidal flats of the
former are so low, and so extensive as to pre-empt navigation for even the
smallest of vessels, 15 3 let alone ocean-going shipping.
But one of the most significant oversights of CeNAWP, NAWAPA, and
the GRAND Canal plan 5 4 concerns the common proposal to feed additional
water into the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence River complex for it potentials rather
grave flooding hazards. This is true for two important reasons. First, in the
past it has been tenuous to predict lake level variations with any hope of
accuracy beyond several weeks. 155 While the Great Lake levels follow a rough
cycle of highs and lows concomitantly with fluctuations in annual precipitation
rates, 1 0 they do not conform to so consistent a pattern such that reliable predictions can be made about level fluctuations over the long term. 57 Notably, this
is despite the existence of accurate data as far back into time as the early
1860's.158 It is important to stress in this connection that the ability to make.
precise forecasts about the variation of lake levels is absolutely crucial to any
plan that would involve artificially augmenting Great Lake water inflows, for
the second interesting feature of the system is that a volume of water added to
151 The most significant flood zone in B.C. is of course the Rocky Mountain Trench
and would involve the loss of its unexplored mineral wealth, as well as its timber and

agricultural potential as noted briefly supra. For this reason, many residents of the province
responded less than enthusiastically. One, for example, wrote:

".... inundating the narrow oasis of habitable land in our desert of mountains is
tantamount to selling or leasing the whole area involved to another nation. Canadians will obtain no direct benefit other than financial from a great area of British
Columbia if, without modification, the North American Water and Power Alliance's
concept is carried through. Our benefits under NAWAPA will then derive solely from
the sale or lease of the flooded valleys."
Cf. Donald Waterfield, Continental Waterboy: The Columbia River Controversy,
Clarke, Irwin and Company, Toronto, 1970, at 213.
152 Climate Plate, Regional Atlas of British Columbia, The Queen's Printer, Victoria,
Columbia, 1965.
British153
In fact, according to one geographer, this even includes boats no larger than
canoes, supra,note 124.
154 It should be noted that of the three plans, the GRAND Canal may alone facilitate James Bay navigation owing to the proposal to dyke to the southern extremity of the
Bay. Water levels covering the tidal flats would presumably be raised for at least some
portion of the year. Just what this period would be, or how much the levels would be
raised and whether or not navigation would thereby be made feasible is unknown at the
time of writing.
155 In other words, level changes can be predicted only so well as can changes in

regional weather patterns. See Great Lakes Water Levels, issued by the Water Resources
Branch under the authority of the Hon. Arthur Laing, P.C., M.P., B.S.A., Minister of
Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1964, at 9 and 14.
150 Ibid., at 8-9. See also Background Material on Water Levels, prepared for use
in connection with the meetings of the House Standing Committee on Mines, Forests, and
Water, October, 1964.
157 See Hydrograph of Monthly Mean Levels of the GreatLakes, published by U.S.
Army Engineering District, Lake Survey. See also, Statement to the OntarioLegislature

by Robert J. Boyer, M.P.P., Second Vice-Chairman, Ontario Hydro, on Great Lakes
Water Levels, Wednesday, February 3, 1965.
1Us Ibid.
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Lake Superior will not alter the lake levels as a whole for three or more years, 9
and cannot be scientifically measured on the mainstream St. Lawrence for over a
decade. 160 For this reason, water increments of the magnitudes involved in
any of the three plans could, if augmented by a naturally occurring period of
high precipitation, create flooding with unprecedented powers of destruction. 1 1
In assessing this danger it is worth bearing in mind that a significant portion
of the industrial heartland of both countries lies immediately adjacent to the
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River system. So too does an eighth of the
North American population. 6 2 Chicago, Detroit, Windsor, Hamilton, Toronto,
and Montreal would all be exposed to the danger of flooding, 0 3 as would all
towns and cities bordering the lakes.
It is possible that one day a solution to this problem of predicting lake
levels may be uncovered, but as of the moment it is abundantly clear that:
(1) No scheme such as NAWAPA, CeNAWP, or the GRAND Canal
plans can be seriously entertained until the solution is found; and
(2) The solution is itself completely contingent upon vast improvements
of our present abilities vis-h-vis long-range weather forecasting, given
precipitation to be the major source of Great Lake water inflows.
At the present moment there does not appear to be any cause for optimism
165
that this problem will be quickly solved.
(b) Cost Oversights
The geographical omissions described above will all import additional
cost factors that will have to be considered in the case of each plan. For
example, with NAWAPA, not only will the value of the arable land submerged
have to be offset by consequent project benefits, but so too will the loss of the
159 Water Levels in the Great Lakes, Bank of Montreal Business Review, February
26, 1965,
at 2. See also supranotes 155, 156 and 157.
160 J.S.Cram, supra note 151, at 147.
61
3 "Yet... strong words of caution should be said..
a danger might exist of
diverting water into the Great Lakes followed by a subsequent year of heavy rain and
snow. Taken together they might cause flood conditions that it would then be too late
to control."
GreatLakes Water Levels, supra,rnote 155, at 14.
162 See William Bowles, Water Shortage is a Frame of Mind, Fortune Magazine,
April, 1965.
163 So too, of course, would all the lesser cities, towns, farms and industries bordering the lake shores.
164 See supra, notes 155, 156, 157 and 162.
165 As one authority noted in this connection during the peak of the most recent

Great Lakes drought:
"On the basis of probabilities, Weather Bureau meteorologists are pretty confident
that the jet stream will move southward again (as it has before), that precipitation
in drought areas will get back to normal patterns, and that someday the Lake Michigan problem will again be outflow, as it was in the early 1950's. This confidence
about the future average precipitation is not based upon any ability to trace continuous chains of courses and effects into years ahead-in that sense weathermen
can only see THIRTY DAYS AHEAD AT MOST, AND THEN ONLY DIMLY.
Instead the confidence rests upon the conviction that nature does not proceed by

way of caprice."
See supra,note 162.
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Rocky Mountain Trench towns of Whitehorse, Prince George and Golden. 687
In at least its initial form, the Parsons engineers also ignored the Columbia,'
Kootenay' 68 and Peace River hydroelectric developments, 69 as well as Canadian
investigations regarding possible development of the Yukon-Atlin-Taku complex,170 Laird River, Skeena River, and Fraser River. 71' In addition, the silver,
lead, zinc, placer gold and other mineral reserves of the southern Canadian
trench 1'7 2 have been forgotten, along with approximately 163 sawmill operations
having capacities ranging from 10,000 to 150,000 board feet per season, 1'7 3
a number of extensive dairy and beef ranches,1' 4 and numerous recreational
areas 175 serving residents of both British Columbia and Alberta.
The navigation systems of NAWAPA, CeNAWP and perhaps the
GRAND Canal plan also bring into issue the inherent economy of canal works
as a means of bulk transport as opposed to the alternative modes such as railroads and highway trucking services. In light of this comparison, it is clear that
rail and highway transport have a large initial advantage in northern climates
inasmuch as they can at least function twelve months of the year.1'7 6 The northern canals, on the other hand, would be frozen over for anywhere from three to
five months 77 and if dependable all-season transport was required, it would be
necessary to construct alternate transportation facilities adjacent to the
canals. 178 Because of this capital redundancy it is rather doubtful that the
economy of summer barge transportation could ever be so great as to justify
the initial investment. 9 In addition, the capital costs of canals ensure that their
routes would be, in the main, fixed. Railroads and highways are, in this respect,
more flexible, owing to the proportionally lesser amounts of capital involved. 80
106 James Laxer, The Politics of the ContinentalResources Deal: The Energy Power
Game, The New Press, Toronto, 1970, at 37.
107 See Plate 3, Western Water Development, Special Subcommittee on Western
Water Development, Committee on Public Works, United States Senate, January 1966,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1966.
108 See Plate No. 7, NAWAPA: Summary Report for Dominion of Canada,supra
Note 162. Libby Dam, it will be noticed, was ignored at this stage of the proposal.
10 See Plate No. 6, ibid. The W.A.C. Bennett Dam (or Portage Mountain Dam as
it then was) appears not to have been included, although NAWAPA contemplates a series
of structures on the river.
170 This project was first considered in the mid-1950's by the Ventures-Frobisher
group.
171See Plate No. 6, supra, note 150. No consideration was given to proposals such
as Moran for the Fraser. See also, supra, note 149.
172 Resources Plate, Regional Atlas of British Columbia, supra,note 152.
173 Forests Plate, ibid.
74 Agricultural Plate, ibid.
175 Lake Windermere is one example. The loss of part of the lakeshore as a consequence of the proposed Columbia-Kootenay reservoir was a very large factor weighing
against Sequence IXa. NAWAPA would adversely affect this and many more such areas.
170 It is of course also true that operation costs in the cases of both modes rises substantially during winter owing in part to snow clearing requirements.
177 Climatic Regions, The CanadianDesk Atlas of the World, 2nd Edition, Oxford
University Press, Toronto, 1963.
178 The problems connected here arise in spring and autumn when the canals would
undergo the transition from ice to water and vice-versa. Presumably, they could be used
as a means of travel when frozen over.
170 That is to say, the investment necessary to adapt the plans for navigation and
not the total investment necessary to realize the canals.
180 That is to say, railroads and trucking services rely upon less immovable real
capital per ton-mile of cargo for the simple reason that the average cost of road surfaces
and rail ties is less per unit distance than are canals.
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Even more basic, the proponents of the three plans have assumed that
there is a water shortage in the United States. It should be noticed that not all
are in agreement,' 81 and of this number some have 8 2 argued that one of the
costs of importing Canadian water will be a needlessly continued waste of
presently despoiled supplies. Briefly, this argument runs as follows: the present
U.S. crisis derives not from a scarcity of water qua water, 83 but rather a scarcity
of clean potable water, and thus the alternative to tapping Canadian supplies
is to instead institute clean-up campaigns of presently polluted water now
available in the United States. In this regard to institute NAWAPA, CeNAWP,
or the GRAND Canal would be taking the "easy way out" in terms of avoiding
the otherwise present necessity of having to abate the rapidly compounding
pollution problem. To the extent that water export would decapitate the political pressure to clean up domestic water resources it would ultimately result in
more harm than good for the U.S.
In yet another sense the plans require careful exploration; namely, as
concerns the inflationary impact such projects as NAWAPA and CeNAWP,
and the proportional growth of governmental economic involvement that would
be necessary to realize either of them. In the case of NAWAPA, the Parsons
Company estimates a total construction impact of $7,000,000,000 per year
for twenty years' 8 4 upon the G.N.P.'s 85 of the three continental economies.
Injections of this magnitude would seem to raise a very serious issue with respect
to sector inflation,' 8 6 for with so much of the continental work force and productive capacity engaged in NAWAPA, and the concomitant falls in unemployment 8 7 and rises in mean incomes that would be the necessary result (i.e. given
construction to be a relatively speaking labour-intensive activity) it would seem
inevitable that wages and consumer good price indices would "skyrocket" over
the short term, barring substantial and rapid changes in productivity. 188 In this
regard it is of note that the proximate productivity effects of NAWAPA,
CeNAWP, and the GRAND Canal are confined to the realms of agrarian
18 1 See Gene Marine, America the Raped, Discus Books, Avon, New York N.Y.,
1969, at 222; and Donald E. Carr,Death of the Sweet Waters, Berkley Publishing Corporation, New York, January 1971, at 43, for two examples of U.S. dissent from the notion
that NAWAPA is needed to augment U.S. supplies.
182 See A.G.L. McNaughton, Address to the Royal Society of Canada, Water
Resources of Canada, supra, note 128, at 16-24, and Death of Sweet Waters, ibid.
183 See Fortune Magazine, supra, note 174 In this regard Bowles wrote:
"... warnings that the U.S. is running out of water rest on wobbly assumptions and
are contradicted by the facts of nature. What's short is not water but good sense
in using it."
184 Construction, engineering, and supply investments would be approximately $2
to $3 billion annually (i.e. compared with $3 to $4 billion annually in the U.S.) See
NAWAPA: North American Water and Power Alliance, supra, note 150, at 8.
185 Gross National Products.
186 In particular, the inflationary effects of these projects would of course be felt first
in the construction, building, and material supply trades.
87
'
The enormous geographical spread of the projects would make them rather
useful as public works designed to ease unemployment for the problems of immobility
would be reduced. There has of course been a rather long tradition of water resource
developments taking place merely to raise employment levels. The U.S. Grand Coulee
Dam was one such case. The recent Quebec announcement of a massive James Bay
project is yet another.
188In short, too much money would chase too few goods.
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production'8 6 in the case of the first two, and primary resource extraction and
the transportation industries in the case of all three.10° While the latter will to
some degree mitigate the spectre of inflation, the former will only aggravate it
(i.e. lower food prices will release more buying power into the consumer nondurable sectors). In net it is doubtful that productivity increases could maintain pace with the rapid rises in demand without stringent public controls over
both prices and incomes being instituted as work on whichever scheme chosen
was initiated.
It is also significant perhaps, that the enormity of NAWAPA, 191
CeNAWP ,19 2 or the GRAND Cana1' 3 plan are such as to put them beyond
the realm of private investment. It is apparent that any one of them would
require massive public financial support. For this reason a substantial public
reassessment of the role of government in our notionally "private economies"
would be necessary. Government, for example, would have to acquire new
spending areas over and above a project such as NAWAPA as a means of
effecting its counter-cyclical controls over the economy, for project outlays
could not be varied greatly for two reasons. The labour intensity of any one of
these projects would make the overall welfare effects simply too great as a first
point. Second, design sequences would no doubt prevent capricious variations
of project expenditures in response to changes in the amplitude of the business
cycle.
Many of the other costs of NAWAPA, CeNAWP, or the GRAND Canal
which would be uncovered in the event that detailed benefit-cost studies were
undertaken have been simply ignored by the proponents of the plans. As was
briefly noted above, in the guise of simplifying the analysis of the productivity
of three schemes, the land and water resources that Canada will forego appear
to have been assumed valueless.194 The literature concerning all of the diversion
plans, for example, refers to "unused" water 95 flowing "wasted"'16 into the
sea. Even if we were to accept this as a premise, it does not therefore necessarily
follow that Canadian water is without value and will forever remain so unless
the country accepts one of these proposals. Quite to the contrary, there are
1

80 As one critic noted:
"In a sense, NAWAPA is another agricultural pork barrel, although it would be
for the farmers of three countries, rather than for farmers of one or two states."
Cf. Donald E.Carr, Death of the Sweet Waters, supra, note 181, at 212.
100 Ile Parsons Company claims in this regard that:
"NAWAPA would increase the annual national income from agriculture, livestock,

mining and manufacturing by approximately $9 billion annually [in Canada].".
Cf.
NAWAPA: North American Water and Power Alliance, supra, note 150, at 9.
191
The Parsons Company does not supply much cost data beyond asserting that
total construction costs would amount to $100,000,000,000.00 at 1964 prices.
192 There is no comparable cost data for CeNAWP to date.
103 Cost estimates range from $1.2 to $2 billion depending upon the nature and
capacity of pumping, power, and navigation facilities to be provided.
104 It should be noted that the benefit-cost estimates contained in each of the proposals are crude in the extreme. None, to the writer's knowledge, has been subjected to
a full-blown benefit-cost analysis, and for this reason the purported benefits claimed of
each one should be viewed with some suspicion.
10 See for example, NAWAPA: North American Water and Power Alliance, supra,
note 150, at 4, and GreatReplenishment and Northern Development Canal, Thomas W.
Kierans, Sudbury, Ontario, at 1.
100 Supra, note 150, at 3.
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numerous alternative employments for the water resources involved, and
further, many alternative means of obtaining the benefits which have been
ascribed to the three plans without the necessity of a water export.
For example, the NAWAPA proponents contend that their scheme will
"provide" Canada with at least 22 M.A.F. of water,197 30,000,000 K.W. of
power, 198 (and a trans-Canada navigation system). It is suggested in turn
that this "delivery" of water will have a favourable impact upon land values
(i.e. via raising agricultural productivity)'9 9 in Western Canada, much to the
benefit of Canadian agrarians, the thousands engaged in agricultural services,
and the farm machine industries, as well as the federal and provincial tax
revenue bases (which would be increased). 200 In addition, it is argued that the
reservoirs will prove to be an important recreational source around which wildlife will for some unexplained reason 20' flourish. 20 2 There can be little doubt
that, on the basis of current projections of the National Energy Board, 20 3
Canada is in need of more power. Nor is there much dispute that an increment
to at least the prairie water supply base would be useful. 20 4 But neither need
is so pressing that the cost of obtaining additional water and power is no
longer important. It is very likely, for example, that all of the ten odd individual
diversion schemes which have been considered 2 5 as a means of delivering more
water to the prairies could provide it at a lower cost and at the same time circumvent all of the international complications that are entailed in a water export.
So far as power generation is concerned, NAWAPA appears to be less practicable as an alternative than a number of present, less ambitious northern
development possibilities in both Canada and the United States. For example,
the Alaskan Rampart Dam project on the Yukon River was to provide only
5,040,000 KW and at that was thought to be too far in advance of projected
197 This figure is an initial one only. According to the Parsons Company, 19 M.A.F.
of this figure would be "arbitrarily allocated" for agrarian uses and 3 M.A.F. allocated to
municipal and industrial use. The ultimate delivery of 110 M.A.F. would be divided 100
M.A.F. and 10 M.A.F. among these user categories respectively. See NAWAPA: Summary
Report for Dominion of Canada,supra, note 150, at 39 and 43.
198 Actual generation in Canada is anticipated to be 60,000,000 K.W., but Canada
is expected to forfeit the 30,000,000 K.W. needed to service the project.
199 See supra, note 190, where it is alleged that national income in Canada would
be heightened by some $9 billion annually. The Summary Report for Canadaplaces this
figure at $8 billion (i.e. there is no explained reason for this inconsistency) but suggests
that ultimately the net value of Canadian production increases would reach $30 billion
annually. See supra, note 150, at 41 and 44.
200 See supra,note 150, at 7.
201 The precise reverse is more apt to be the result, for particularly in the case of
larger species, flooding would require territorial readjustments. For many species the
sense of territorial sanctity is so compelling that they will perish when displaced.
202 NAWAPA, according to the Parsons Company, also offers Canada the following benefits which deserve quotations in full. It is alleged rather extravagantly that
NAWAPA will "raise Canada to the leading position in the Commonwealth, ahead of the
United Kingdom" and will "raise Canada to great power status and consequent co-equal
sharing of free world leadership with the United States and the European Common
Market." See supra, note 150, at 45.
203
Supra, note 162, at 38.
2
o4 Supra, note 151 at 140.
20
5 See Submission to the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs by
the Government of Saskatchewan on the Columba River Treaty, Regina, Saskatchewan,
May 8, 1964.

300

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 9, No. 2

market demands to be justifiable. 20 6 There are also reports of a power surplus
available from Kemano near Kitimat in northern British Columbia which has
yet to be used. In addition, there is207 the future potential of the Yukon-AtlinTaku diversion plan.
Returning to water, the United States for its own part has alternative
methods of supplementing the waning supplies of its arid regions. For example,
the American southwest can and no doubt will at some point in the future draw
from the 180 M.A.F.208 of flow of the Columbia River. This is twice the volume
of water that NAWAPA would provide each year. 20 9 Even the power supplies
made available in the U.S. by the Parsons plan are less than one-half the amount
to be provided by the planned federal development programs which the project
would replace. 210 No such statistics are, as of yet, available with respect to
CeNAWP and the GRAND Canal. But it seems likely that while they may
represent conceptual milestones in continental resource planning, they are all
far from persuasive vis-A-vis the many regional alternatives at hand.
(c) EcologicalUnknowns
Each of the projects would seem to tentatively risk the odd apocalyptic
spillover which deserves brief mention here. Apart from the problem of Great
Lake flooding referred to above, there are the additional possibilities of massive
lenticular shifting, extensive climatic alteration, and underlying ecological
restructurings.
As was noted earlier, much of the project area at issue to all three plans
lies in regions noted for their harshness of climate. This is particularly true of
the Rocky Mountain Trench region. 211 Characteristically, the subsoil of these
regions is permafrost and for this reason in many cases gives a deceptive impression of stability. The reality is frequently that large lenticular masses are merely
held in a suspended condition by ice. Reservoirs such as that required by
NAWAPA would subject such masses to a greater heat inflow212 than normal,
which might provoke massive geological restructurings. In short, the Rocky
Mountain Trench, as an example, might well prove to be a rather unreliable
reservoir.
NAWAPA in particular seems rather carelessly researched in light of the
apparent geological dangers. Not only do geological problems arise in relation
206 Rampart Dam and the Economic Development'of Alaska, Vol. 1, Summary
Report, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, March 1966.
207 For details see Brief to the Royal Commission on Canada'sEconomic Prospects
by Northwest Power Industries Ltd., Victoria, B.C., November 1955, and Ventures Ltd.,
Annual Report, 1953.
208 See supra, note 61.
200 NAWAPA would deliver 78 M.A.F. annually to the U.S. See NAWAPA: North
American
Water and Power Alliance, supra, note 150, at 9.
2
1o NAWAPA would on the other hand provide twice the water storage for use in
the U.S. as was provided in the current federal planning as of 1966. See Western Water
Development, supra, note 167, at 5 and passim.
211 Cf. Permafrost in Canada,based on a map prepared by the National Research
Council and the Geological Survey of Canada, The Royal Geographic Society, D. Davis,
Map No.
1, CanadianGeographicalJournal.
2 12
Supra, note 182, at 19.
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to the great weight redistribution that would result from the creation of a trench
reservoir, 213 but also in relation to the safety of a number of specific damsites.
Of particular note are the two projects in the Alaskan fault region; Chitina Dam
on the Copper River, 190 miles to the east of Anchorage, and Watana Dam on
the Susitna River, 110 miles to the north. The former would be built to a height
of 1,700 feet and the latter to a height of 880 feet.214 Both lie in an area famous
for earthquake activity, and both, because of their enormous size, would-be built
at the limit of our contemporary technical understandings of dam construction.
The risk element from earth tremors would therefore seem to be exceedingly
great.
Another factor concerns the vast tracts of Canada's 500,000 odd square
miles of muskeg that lie in the path of NAWAPA, CeNAWP, and the GRAND
Canal, which would to some extent be affected. It is now evident that in the far
north muskeg is the most important water supply controlling agent, and for this
reason it is possible that any alternation by way of the creation of new reservoirs
or diversions would reap a devastating impact upon the physical and mechanical
constitution and physiography of this natural regulator of water supply.2 5
There are yet other climatic influences as a result of these sorts of artificial
changes about which considerable evidence has recently come to the fore216
which strongly suggests that alterations would be substantial. At issue here is
the notion that Canada's northern waters flow "unused" into the sea. This adjective is remiss to the extent that it neglects a process known as "haline circulation" by which fresh water, as it meets saltwater, induces an inland transport of
the latter. The ratio of this transport of salt to fresh is approximately one
hundred to one.2 17 As a natural phenomenon, haline circulation plays a vital
role in determining climatic patterns218 wherever salt and fresh water mix. It is
inescapable that the reduction in flow of fresh water consequent to NAWAPA,
CeNAWP, or the GRAND Canal will provoke rather far reaching changes in
regional climatic patterns as a necessary concomitant, which will in turn pose a
threat to the underlying ecology for huge tracts of the country.
The potential extent of these changes should not be underrated. An
American scientist with the U.S. Coastguard, for example, has argued that a
reversal of rivers presently entering Hudson Bay would have the immediate
effect of lowering the temperature of its waters, which would in turn have the
effect of reducing the moderating influence of the Labrador and Baffin currents.
213 The Rocky Mountain Trench reservoir would have a storage capacity of
518,200,000 A.F. This would weigh roughly 1,408,000,000,000,000 lbs. or 702 billion

tons (!)

214E. Roy Tinney, "Engineering Aspects", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1967, at 22.
215See Norman W. Radforth, NAWAPA and Muskeg, supra, note 186, at 27, and
Trevor Lloyd, ForeignAffairs, July 1970, at 731.
2
16 H. A. Neu, "Notes on the Effect of Diversions of Water on the Climate of the
Continent", McNaughton Papers,and cited supra, note 182, at 19.
217 Thus for example, measurements conducted at Baie Comeau have shown that
an outflow of 330,000 cubic feet per second of fresh water induces an inland transport of
roughly 30,000,000 cubic feet per second of saltwater.
213See for example, Minutes of Proceedings, Second International Oceanographic
Congress, Moscow, June 1966.

OSGOODE HALL LAW* JOURNAL

[VOL. 9,*NO. 2

would be felt as far away as
The subsequent climatic response, it was argued,
219
the New England coastal area, if not further.
The influence that the haline circulation process can have upon a region's
ecology presents a very serious challenge to the notion that an area's water supplies can ever be without value. It is to the contrary rather evident that Canada
has no reserve of excess or surplus water that can be trans-shipped without cost
to the exporting region. Any decision to export from one area to another will
therefore have to rest upon a prior resolution of competing uses and values as between regions as is true in all cases of resource allocation. In short, the premise
relied upon by the proponents of NAWAPA, CeNAWP and the GRAND Canal,
that a region derives no benefit from the presence of a natural supply of water, is
specious. Indeed it is not necessary to look too far to see the truth of this so far
as the Canadian north is concerned. NAWAPA, for example, would deprive
some of the richest timber stands and fisheries on the globe of water which forms
the very basis of their existence.
In summary, each of the three export proposals suffer from overwhelming
geographical, cost, and ecological deficiencies. They are so serious that it is only
too easy to dismiss all of the plans as basically impracticable. But in terms of the
more general question of water export it is clear that, imperfect as they are,
NAWAPA, CeNAWP, and the GRAND Canal have raised a significant issue in
terms of one of the compromises that may be expected of Canadian sovereignty
as the price of possessing the northern perimeter of the world's most highly
industrialized and resource-consuming power.
(d) The Legalitiesof Water Export
The implications of a large-scale water export in terms of the possible
erosion of Canadian sovereign control is the subject of some controversy. In
this connection one author has argued that:
"... the negative argument [against water export] ...presupposes the inability of
Canadian negotiators to conclude a treaty which maximizes Canada's interests in
the sale of her resources. It is submitted that this inferiority complex is unwarranted." 220

On the other hand to the extent that past precedent should be the guide it is
perhaps a stronger argument that recent developments of trans-boundary water
law supply a rather firm basis for pessimism vis-h-vis any Canadian participation
in negotiations of this kind. First, the lengthy history of inconsistent application
of the purportedly grounding precepts of international law in the area (re discussion in sections III, IV, and V) would make it necessary for ihe negotiation
of an agreement certain within its own terms and totally independent of presently
unreliable precedents of the existing law in force between the two countries.
Second, in terms of the two major treaties concluded in this area, the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909 and the Columbia River Treaty, Canada emerged very
much the poorer for her involvement as has been shown above. There does not
appear to be much in the way of at least treaty precedent that commends itself
to the suggestion that Canada "can do better next time."
219 R.C. Kollmeyer, ibid.
220 Richard Dixon, Constitutional Aspects of Water Export, Agassiz Center for
Water Studies, The University of Manitoba. The insertions are my own.
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It has, however, been argued that water export is not the critical, all-ornothing issue that has been thus far assumed by this paper. Professor E. Kuiper,
for example, suggests that:
"... it is likely that the United States and Mexico will discover that it is more

economical to desalinize seawater at selected points along their own coastline, and
pump it to the areas where it is needed. Thus, the treaty of water will be terminated,
not by Canada because 22
it needs its own water, but by our neighbours, because the
price becomes too high." 1

Once more there is enough uncertainty with respect to this argument that it
remains less than persuasive. First, the development of low-cost desalinization
techniques will be to a large extent the concomitant of need. Once the demands
for additional water are satisfied by way of an export from Canada it may prove
that the incentive to devote otherwise productive sums to methods of converting
salt water to fresh will disappear.2 22 Second,while it is conceivable that on coastlines it may be possible to desalinize at a cost which is competitive with the
impounding of fresh water, trans-shipment expenses will certainly remain the
crucial factor in terms of deciding upon desalinated seawater or new fresh water
sources. It is doubtful that desalinization plants on the pacific coast could compete with interior water diversions in terms of market needs east of the Rockies.
The cost of pumping sea water over the divide would simply be too great, and for
at least arid areas of the continent's interior, a fresh water system such as
CeNAWP would no doubt be a more optimal conduit. Thus, for all of these
reasons, to say that the possibility of the future innovation of diversion substitutes as a means of obtaining more water should allay Canadian fears concerning
an irrevocable commitment is a dangerous over-simplifiction.
In this regard it should be noticed that the United States does not see the
import question as anything but a permanent arrangement. As Senator Moss,
for example, noted before the Royal Society of Canada at its 1966 meeting in
Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada could not manage such an arrangement on a ...
223
turn-off turn-on basis".
In view of these factors, at the present moment the possibility of a future
water export treaty with the U.S. holds many risks for Canada as respects practical economic considerations, environmental problems, and uncertain legal
precedents which have obscured the extent to which national sovereignty could
be preserved. While resolution of the first two aspects is beyond the scope of this
paper, it is suggested that much can be done to resolve the ambiguity subsisting
in the presently developed law.

VII
THE NEED FOR CERTAINTY: TWO CLARIFYING PRECEDENTS
Two main features can be said to characterize trans-boundary water law
and the Canadian position with respect thereto: first, it has evolved a number of
22

1 E. Kuiper,

CanadianWater Export, as cited at p. 9, ibid.

222 Unless of course it can be argued that the mere possibility of Canada repatriating

her water is a sufficient incentive. It will be suggested infra that it is not.

223 "U.S. Senator Pleads for NAWAPA Study". Reclamation, September 1966.
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serious ambiguites which are demanding of clarification, and second, international water use questions are approaching a crisis point as a consequence of
what appears to be a growing demand for more water in the United States.
At the present time Canada is a house divided as respects the issue of
whether water should be considered just another exportable natural resource or
something more. Not only has this lack of resolve been evident in public policy
statements of federal politicians; 224 it is also implicit from the uncertainties that
have begun to fetter trans-boundary riparian relations and the lack of policy
with respect to the assertion of jurisdiction over trans-boundary waters originating within Canada. The United States has not proven to be so inattentive.
Canada has had to confront a series of skilled American negotiators that have
consistently pressed their nation's best interests. They have proven successful in
preserving all of the benefits that flow from their own sovereignty (re: the Sage
Creek, Waneta Dam, Waterton and Belly, and Souris references), have nonethe-less managed to simultaneously extract enormous concessions from Canada
(re: the Columbia-Kootenay development), and are apt to advance upon their
record of past success with the negotiation of the impending water export issue.
Canada, instead of resisting this apparent depreciation of domestic sovereignty,
appears to be more apt to institutionalize it by way of conceding international
legal recognition of the two doctrines of international law, (i.e. the doctrines of
prior appropriationand equitable apportionment) which most depart from the
strict sovereignty theory of the Boundary Waters Treaty, and readily entering
into the debate as to whether they refer to merely trans-boundary issues or Canadian water resources in toto.
At the present moment, increasing public attention is being focused upon
possible sovereignty difficulties arising from large concentrations of foreign
ownership in certain Canadian industrial sectors. It is something of a paradox
that a protective policy should develop concerning foreign ownership of developed enterprise and at the same time nothing be done with respect to the protection of one of the basic assets upon which so much industry and virtually all
settlement so crucially depends. It is submitted that this situation should be
rectified. In particular, it is suggested that:
(1) The doctrine of prior appropriationshould be rejected. Its effect is to
extinguish pre-existing rights of title and is therefore inconsistent with
the preservation of sovereignty vis4--vis waters lying within Canada;
(2) The doctrine of equitable apportionment should be rejected. Its effect
is to deny full rights of title and to subordinate the same to interests
outside of the jurisdiction. It therefore is also inconsistent with the
preservation of sovereign control over the domestic resource base;
(3) Article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty should be refurbished as
the guiding principle of the international law. It preserves and remaximizes domestic sovereignty, maximizes negotiation strength, and
is the most certain and unequivocal starting point for international
co-operation.
22 4

For example, federal Energy, Mines and Resources Minister JJ. Greene, was

quoted as having said that Canadian water was not for sale, while almost at the same
moment Prime Minister Trudeau was busy asking a national television audience, .... why
shouldn't we sell our water resources for good cold hard cash?" Cf. supra note 181.
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A reinstatement of Article II would be of enormous benefit to Canada in
several respects. First, it would solve the problem of reasserting the rights of
unrestricted title over the Columbia River storage projects in Canada, as well
as the right to make upstream use of the Kootenay, upon expiration of the
Columbia River Treaty. As was considered in Section IV, ambiguities within
the actual agreement and the pre-existing IJ.C. precedents make Canada's
claims in this regard tenuous, whereas if Article II were to be continued as the
operative law they would be more certain. Second, clarification of the status of
this provision as was suggested above would have the additional effect of establishing that the Canadian right to make consumptive divisions over the life of
the treaty as provided for under Article X]I 2 25 and quoted above, is not subject to equal "as of right" claims in relation to downstream withdrawals of this
nature, but is instead a prior and superseding right accruing to the exclusive
Canadian status as the upstream riparian.
Third, Article II, as the prevailing principle of law maximizes Canadian
advantage with respect to other major undeveloped trans-boundary water resources of the continent apart from the Columbia and Kootenay. Most of these
lie in Western Canada and, most importantly, most also flow in a north-south
direction. This, however, is not to suggest that this should be viewed as license
to injure downstream dependencies in the U.S. But it is nevertheless important
that Canada re-assert sovereignty over these waters if only to ensure that present
and future co-operative ventures do not fetter domestic control over this part of
the nation's resource base in perpetuity.
Within this same context, the fourth advantage to a reassertion of the
second article of the Boundary Waters Treaty is the complete routing of the
notion of a "continental water resource heritage". Canada would by claiming the
maximum rights of sovereignty possible within trans-boundary riparian law,
obtain the strongest possible base from which to deal with the issue of water
export, and in the event that such a treaty was struck, could minimie the
long-term risks arising therefrom vis-4L-vis the retention of domestic sovereignty.
At the time of writing, two separate trans-boundary issues have arisen
which are well suited as vehicles for the reassertion of Article II by Canada:
these are the proposed Shuswap-Okanagan diversion and the Skagit Valley
dispute. Each has been separately discussed below.
(a) The Shuswap-OkanaganDiversion
The Shuswap River lies wholly within Canada. Its source waters lie a few
short miles to the west of the Columbia River near the town of Revelstoke and
flow in a zig-zag pattern through Shuswap Lake to meet with the South Thompson and ultimately the Fraser River.
The Okanagan River is, on the other hand, international. Originating in
Lake Okanagan in Canada its waters flow to the south to eventually connect
with the mainstem Columbia near the town of Brewster in the State of Washington.
225 Cf. supra, note 94.
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The Canadian Okanagan region is semi-arid, being one of the driest areas
of the country. It has experienced in the past rather severe drought conditions
which have had detrimental effects upon the area's agricultural output. While
there is some controversy as to whether the water shortage is the result of control and storage difficulties or an actual shortage of run-off, 220 there has been

rather strong support for a water import from areas to the north where water is
more plentiful. In particular, it has been suggested that a portion of the Shuswap
flow might be redirected into
the Okanagan system to supplement existing
227
supplies in the latter region.
From the point where the Okanagan and Columbia Rivers join to the
mouth of the latter, all but some seventy-seven feet of Columbia head have
been developed for hydroelectric power generation. Should the ShuswapOkanagan integration occur, it has been argued that a net international flow
increase would prove inevitable. 228 It would more importantly confer a perceptible gain for U.S. power producers and furthermore could be attributed to the
Fraser (of which the Shuswap-Thompson system is a part) rather than the
Columbia basin.
The fact that waters from the Fraser basin are to be introduced into an
international system carries with it a number of risks. First, it provides a basis
for a U.S. claim under the doctrine of prior appropriationover that proportion
of the diverted Shuswap flow which has had a perceptible impact upon the rate
of flow of the Okanagan at the forty-ninth parallel. This may bar Canada from
reapplying the diverted waters to uses outside the Okanagan and in practical
effect make the Shuswap-Okanagan integration a permanent arrangement. Second, if this proves to actually be the case it will represent a rather crucial precedent in terms of the legal relations between the two countries for it will earmark
the growth of the application of international law from trans-boundary waters
(as defined by Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty) to include a wholly
national basin. The extent of this jurisdictional inroad is a debatable point but
two issues are indisputable; namely, notionally it will be of significance, and
will represent a fettering of Canadian sovereign jurisdiction to some limited
degree.
It is suggested that given the above possibilities it is not advisable to make
use of Fraser basin waters as a means of augmenting Okanagan supplies. A
better source would be the mainstem Columbia.22 9 In the first place this would
prevent the involvement of waters other than those originating from transboundary rivers. Second, and more importantly, it would make it possible to
220 Historically, storage regulation on Lake Okanagan has been rather limited and
has suffered from the inability to accurately predict inflows during the spring run-off.
There is thus an important waste factor which aggravates the water problem.
227 A minimum diversion of 285,000 acre feet has been recommended to meet
Okanagan water demands to the year 2000. A.R.D.A. (Research) Project No. 10031
reports 2August 1966 and May 1967.
2 81 .A. McDougall, "Report on the Proposed Fraser-Columbia Water Transfer:
Some Economic and Legal Implications for the Upstream Riparians," Osgoode Hall Law
Journal,Vol. 8, November 1970, No. 2, at 309-311. The essentials of the argument below
have been detailed at length in this article.
229 By way of an Eagle Pass diversion into the Shuswap headwaters as was considered
in the 1956 B.C. Engineering Company Report concerning the then proposed ColumbiaFraser diversion.
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clarify Canada's consumptive title which the Columbia River Treaty appears
to have obscured, and coincidentally permit the reassertion of Article II.
The mechanics of this proposal are not complicated. Columbia waters
presently controlled in Canada flow only to the United States where they are
used "as of right" for the generation of hydroelectric power. But under the
Treaty, as noted above, Canada can, notwithstanding the U.S. power producers' need for storage, make consumptive diversions. But as also noted, it is not
clear whether Canada as upstream owner has any greater claim upon the
Columbia waters for this purpose than does the U.S. If Article XIII and Article
II of the Boundary Waters Treaty are to be read conjunctively, it can be argued
that the Canadian right is a paramount one, but as has been shown above,
Article Irs status is presently in some doubt.
Water diverted from the Columbia into the Shuswap can flow in one of
two directions; namely, it can flow through the Thompson and Fraser to the
Pacific, or it can be diverted back into the Columbia basin via the Okanagan.
Having in mind this option it is suggested that an amount deliberately in excess
of the Okanagan's projected needs be withdrawn from the Columbia under
Article XIII and redirected through the Okanagan conditionally upon the
reservation by Canada that its options with respect to future consumptive uses
will be preserved notwithstanding any consumptive uses downstream in the
United States. This is in effect Article II, but expanded so as to include consumptive rights of upstream riparians. Such a reservation would be tantamount
to a reinstatement of its application internationally as well as a welcome (i.e.
from the Canadian point of view) clarification of Article XIII of the Columbia
River Treaty. It would also estop claims under the doctrine of priorappropriation if and when the waters diverted into the Okanagan were redirected to the
Thompson and Fraser or elsewhere.
(b) The Skagit Valley Dispute
The Skagit River rises in the Province of British Columbia to the west of
the Cascade Mountains, and flows southwards for some 28 miles before it
crosses the international boundary. From here it continues to flow through the
State of Washington for a further 135 miles to ultimately discharge into the
Pacific Ocean through the Strait of Juan de Fuca. At a point approximately
30 miles downstream from the international frontier, the City of Seattle constructed the Ross Dam for the purpose of providing hydroelectric power for
the needs of that city. On August 6, 1941 Seattle applied to the International
Joint Commission for authorization to raise the natural water level of the Skagit
River by some 130 feet to an altitude of 1725 feet above sea level at the boundary, thereby inundating 5475 acres more or less in the Province of British
Columbia. I.J.C. approval was given2 30 subject to two conditions. 23' First, that
Seattle adequately compensate the Province and any Canadian private interests
adversely affected, and that the level of Ross Dam not be raised until a binding
agreement be struck between the City and the Province and any private inter230

Approval was given on January 27, 1942.

231 See Order of Approval, at 3-4.
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ests providing for said indemnification. The second condition, because of its
bearing upon the discussion to follow has been set out in full:
'The Commission expressly reserves its powers under the [Boundary Waters]
Treaty further to exercise jurisdiction over effects on the natural water levels at
and above the international boundary, and to amend this order or issue additional
orders for the protection and indemnification of the Province of British Columbia,
or any affected private interest in Canada, that may be found by the Commission
to have sustained damage by reason of any violation of the terms of this order;
provided, that any such further order shall be issued only after the Commission
shall have received and considered a formal application filed by the aggrieved party
in accordance with the Commission's Rules of Procedure, and after due notice has
been given and an opportunity
of hearing afforded to all interested parties in the
23 2
United States and Canada."

An agreement was concluded between the province and the city of Seattle
on January 10, 1967233 wherein the latter obtained permission to flood the
required 6,300 Canadian acres for a period of 99 years from the date of execution in exchange for consideration of an annual rental of $34,566.21 or an
equivalent value in electrical energy at the option of the province.23 4 This
arrangement has been subjected to some understandable criticism. The propriety of an annual rental fee of $5.50 per acre of Canadian soil has been challenged, and the negotiation called an "economic disaster". 23 5 A Vancouverbased ecology group 236 has also been outspoken in its attempts to prevent the
flooding. They make note of the fact that the region has rather great value as
one of the few wilderness recreation areas accessible to Lower Mainland residents, as well as for the reason of being a natural sanctuary for a variety of
wildlife. 237 Confronted with this mounting opposition, the British Columbia
government's Resources Minister has been quoted as saying:
"If the federal government can get it stopped, fine and dandy. We're saying23more
power to you; go to it. But it's your action; don't call yourselves our agents." 8

In light of the fact that the next most economical power source would cost
Seattle an additional $1,000,000 per annum, 239 the British Columbia refusal to
accept responsibility for a repudiation of the agreement is perhaps the only
sensible course left open to it.
Repudiation of the agreement, however, may be possible at the federal
level in two ways. First, the third section of the InternationalRivers Improve-

ments Act 240 provides that:

"The Governor in Council may, for the purpose of developing and utilizing the
water resources of Canada in the national interest, make regulations (a) respecting
the construction, operation and maintenance of international river improvements;
(b) respecting the issue, cancellation and suspension of licences for the construction,
232 Ibid., at 4.
233 LJ.C. file copy.
234 Ibid., at 3-4.
235 Toronto Star, February 20, 1971, at 17, "A Bubbling Stream Causes Canada-U.S.
Ecology Row".
230 S.P.E.C. or the Society for the Protection of Environmental Conservation.
237 This includes a variety of fish breeds, deer and small mammals, and over 40
species of birds.
23
8 Supra,note 235.
239 Ibid.
24
0International River Improvements Act and Regulations, S.C. 1955, c. 47 and
S.O.R. 1956, number 9 (P.C. 1955-1899).
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operation and maintenance of international river improvements; (c) prescribing
(d) excepting any international river
fees for licences issued under this Act; and ' 241
improvements from the operation of this Act.

and Section four further provides that:
"No person shall construct, operate or maintain an international river improvement
unless he holds a valid licence therefor issued under this Act:242

Because the proposed expansion of Ross Dam described in the British
Columbia-Seattle Agreement involves both an "increase, decrease, or
[alteration of] the natural flow of an international river" 243 and an interference "with... the actual or potential use of [an] international river outside
Canada", it would seem therefore to be within the charge of the Act. This
being so the agreement would seem further subject to federal alteration under
the authority of section three. Under such circumstances can it be said that
the provincial-Seattle agreement is at law "binding"? If not, it would seem
that the original terms of the I.J.C.'s order of approval have not been met.
In addition, it can be argued that the validity of the agreement is jeopardized by the sixth and seventh paragraphs of Article VIII of the Boundary
Waters Treaty. Paragraph six provides that:
"The Commission in its discretion may make its approval in any case conditional
upon the construction of remedial or protective works to compensate so far as
possible for the particular use or diversion proposed, and in such cases may require
that suitable and adequate provision, approved by the Commission, be made for the
protection 244
and indemnity against injury of any interests on either side of the

boundary."

Paragraph seven sets out the Commission's jurisdiction in reference to
the particular case of changes in natural water level elevations:
"In cases involving the elevation of the natural level of waters on either side of the
line as a result of the construction or maintenance on the other side of remedial
or protective works or dams or other obstructions in boundary waters or in waters
flowing therefrom or in waters below the boundary in rivers flowing across the
boundary, the Commission shall require, as a condition of its approval thereof, that
suitable and adequate provision, approved by it, be made for the protection and
indemnity2 4 of
all interests on the other side of the line which may be injured
5
thereby."

This last paragraph, coupled with the fact of the original I.J.C. order
of approval being subject to the condition that British Columbia and any
concerned Canadian private interests be adequately compensated, would
appear to prima facie leave room to argue that the B.C.-Seattle agreement can
noted and filed the
be repudiated by Canada for the I.J.C. has received,
24 6
agreement, but has not "approved" it per Article VMI.
While it is suggested that the federal government or the I.J.C. should
repudiate this apparently bad settlement, it is not contended that the Ross
Lake backflooding should be prohibited. As was the case with the Shuswap241

S. 3, ibid.

242 S. 4, ibid.

S. 2, ibid.
Paragraph 6, Article VIH, supra,note 1.
Paragraph 7, Article VII, ibid.
6 Supra,note 248.

243
244
245
24
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Okanagan integration, the Skagit Valley controversy provides yet another
avenue through which Canada can attempt to re-assert the status of Article I
as still valid international law. Once more it is argued that the value of this
far outweighs the ecological damages Canada may suffer as a consequence of
the increase in elevation of floodwaters backed up into Canada. In particular,
it is suggested that approval be given to Seattle subject to a reservation couched
in similar terms to that contained in the earlier Waneta order referred to
above. 247 Such a reservation might therefore read as below:
"Issuance of the order of approval should not be construed as waiving or otherwise
impairing in any degree the right of Canada recognized in Article II of the Boundary
Waters Treaty, to construct, maintain, and operate such works as it may consider
necessary or desirable for the purpose of making the most advantageous use
practicable on its own side of the international boundary by diversion for any
purpose the waters of the Skagit River as it may be regulated by headwater storage
reservoirs lying entirely within Canada and constructed wholly at the expense of
Canada, or the expense of Canadian interests."

IX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper began with a summary of the International Joint Commission
and the concluding of the Boundary Waters Treaty in 1909. It was noted that
originally Canada had not been entirely pleased with this agreement; most
particularly its second article. Through a tracing of five trans-boundary
references to the Commission it was shown that the status of this provision had
grown increasingly obscured until when finally the Columbia River Treaty
represented a first formally acknowledged departure from it. It was argued
that the situation subsisting as of this time was an ambiguity between three
competing principles of trans-boundary water resource development; namely,
Article I1or the strict sovereignty theory, the doctrine of prior appropriation,
and the doctrine of equitable apportionment. It -was also suggested that as of
1961 it was now within Canada's interests to strictly adhere to the original
law and formally reject the latter two principles, as recognition of either
would be inconsistent with the preservation of full rights of national sovereignty
over resources of domestic origin. In this connection, attention was drawn to
three major water export schemes which can be seen as the logical extension
of the continental development theory implicit to prior appropriation and
equitable apportionment. Note was made of a number of economic, ecological,
and legal problems inherent to the schemes which must be solved, and it was
strongly contended in conclusion that an export not be permitted or considered
in the interim.
Having in mind these developments it was argued that two current transboundary water problems should be used as devices through which Canada
might re-establish the original law. In the case of the Shuswap-Okanagan
controversy it was recommended that Canada assert the rights given under
Article 11 with an eye towards first, preserving jurisdiction over the Canadian
24

7 See supra, p. 276, supra, note 5.
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Columbia storages by means of limiting the effect of the Columbia agreement
to power considerations, and second, re-establishing the Canadian right to
make pre-emptory diversions from the Columbia and Kootenay for consumptive purposes during the life of the Treaty, and for any purpose upon its expiry.
The Shuswap-Okanagan diversion, in other words, could prove to be a valuable
vehicle for clarification of the Columbia River Treaty and for the rejection
of the competing doctrines which have grown to rival the original precepts as
set out first in 1909.
In the case of the Skagit Valley controversy it was suggested that employment of a reservation of Article II's rights with respect to the IJ.C. order of
approval could be yet another means through which Canada could contend
that it considers Article II to be the prevailing definition of national right with
respect to trans-boundary water resources.
Both precedents, it is argued, would well serve the national interest
insofar as they would clarify otherwise obscured law so as to preserve the
benefits of sovereignty and decapitate the current argument of the proponents
of water export that legal recognition has been accorded the notion of a
"continental resource pool".

